

Talking to Strangers

Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education

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Rhetoric, a Good Thing

WHAT NEW HABITS, finally, should we adopt? I think we need a citizenship of political friendship. The phrase designates both a set of ideas and some core habits that might guide our relations to the strangers with whom we share our polity. I discussed the ideas implicit in political friendship in the last chapter; now I turn to the habits. How can the expertise of friendship be brought to bear on politics?

I begin with a simple thought. Remember that Aristotle had described political friendship as differing from ordinary friendship in "not possessing the emotional factor (*men pathos*) of affection for one's associates" (*NE* 4.6). This Aristotelian virtue of public life, concerning proper interaction with strangers, looks like friendship even if it doesn't feel like it, since an emotional charge is missing. Political friendship is not mainly (or not only) a sentiment of fellow-feeling for other citizens. It is more importantly a way of acting in respect to them: friendship, known to all, defines the normative aspirations. One doesn't even have to like one's fellow citizens in order to act toward them as a political friend. There is a very easy way of transforming one's relations to strangers. We might simply ask about all our encounters with others in our polity, "Would I treat a friend this way?" When we can answer "yes," we are on the way to developing a citizenship that is neither domination nor acquiescence. When the answer is no, we have not escaped our old, bad habits.

Beyond this simple question, there exist several other specific techniques for cultivating political friendship. It is time to turn to the imperfect ideals for trust production crafted in the rhetorical tradi-

tion. I find important aids to inject friendship into citizenship in Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*. That book is neither a guide to manipulation nor a superficial manual of style, but rather a philosophically subtle analysis of how to generate trust in ways that preserve an audience's autonomy and accord with the norms of friendship. Notably, he begins his treatise with the overarching point that a speaker must remember that it is the business of the audience to judge, not to learn (1.1.6). Here he invokes a distinction from the *Nicomachean Ethics* between the understanding of the judge and of the student. A judge's understanding operates in the field of opinion, where each must make her own decision; a student's understanding is to be led to truth by a teacher (*NE* 6.10.3-4). Rhetoric is the art not of rousing people to immediate or unthinking action but of putting as persuasive an argument as possible to an audience and then leaving actual choices of action to them. But let me provide some background on the *Art of Rhetoric*, that is, on the book itself, before I turn to its substance: the art of trust production.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle had defined the art of politics as involving two distinct sciences: legislation, which deals in general, prescriptive rules, and judgment, which concerns the actions to be taken in particular cases (6.7). It is seldom noticed that the *Politics* concentrates only on legislation and primarily on constitutions, ignoring the subject of deliberation other than to affirm its importance and to argue that the many will typically judge better than a single individual. Aristotle left the study of judgment, and of the speeches that lead up to it, to the *Rhetoric*. Judgment is not merely the second political science but also, according to the *Rhetoric*, "that for the sake of which rhetoric is used" (2.1.2; cf. 1.1.10).¹

Decisions that cannot be automatically determined by simple reference to the law, and that are ultimately a matter of judgment, are carried out in the realm of "equity," as Aristotle calls it. Equity is not merely that quality of character which aids conflict resolution among friends and friendly citizens; it also names the arena of public decision making where resolutions can be achieved only when citizens and politicians establish conditions in which adversaries can yield. Aristotle's account of the relationship between law and equity requires that judgments issuing from communal deliberation be compatible, like the rule of law, with the consent of citizens, whose equality and

autonomy they protect.² The quality of the citizenly speech preceding a judgment will determine whether citizens can make their equity decisions justly.³

What kind of persuasion is compatible with legitimate consent? Interestingly, Aristotle's discussions of consent also identify the varieties of legitimate persuasion. He describes those who have consented to obey in legitimate regimes with the Greek phrase *boulomenoi peitharkhein*. This term, *peitharkhein*, has the word for persuasion, *peithō*, in it; the phrase *boulomenoi peitharkhein* therefore identifies people who obey because they wish (*boulomenoi*) to obey on the basis of having been persuaded. He also uses the term *peitharkhein* to talk about the operations of the soul, and this other usage delimits precisely the kind of persuasion that is compatible with consent.⁴ "The irrational part of the soul has two parts," he writes, "one that is vegetative, and one that shares the rational principle to the degree of being amenable to it and persuadable by it [*peitharkhikon*] even as we say one consents [*logon echon*] to the speech of father and friends and not as in mathematics" (*NE* 1.13.18). This description of one part of the soul consenting to another part has within it two different models for understanding the nature of persuasion: it may be equivalent to the speech either of father to child or of friend to friend. The former establishes a hierarchical relationship between speaker and audience, the latter a relationship of democratic equality. As it turns out, the hierarchical model is nowhere to be found in the *Rhetoric* as example, explanation, or justification for the art of rhetoric; persuasion is treated solely as the speech of a friend. For instance, Aristotle remarks that those who are stronger than others force people to do things (*maghazo, kreisson*), but friends persuade each other (*peithoi, philoi*) (*R* 2.19.9–10). Masters (*kurioi*), in contrast—and fathers were masters in ancient Greece—use a combination of force and persuasion. To be fully a "persuader" and not a master or aggressor, one must address oneself to others as a friend and democratic equal.⁵

And which others, exactly, should one address this way? Aristotle asks his students to imagine speaking to an audience consisting of people from diverse economic classes and with varying abilities, educations, and experiences. They are even to imagine that their audiences include people who envy or dislike them as well as people who believe slanderous lies about them. Finally, the art pertains not only

to public life but to every citizen's daily interactions. "Everybody," he says, "has in a manner a share in both rhetoric and dialectic since everyone, up to a certain point, endeavors to criticize or uphold an argument, and to defend himself or to make accusations" (*R* 1.1). The *Rhetoric* is in fact a treatise on talking to strangers. At last, we have hit upon some useful clues as to how to do that.

To understand trust, one must begin with distrust. Two types of it trouble politics. First, there is the distrust that arises from the instability of political events, and the difficulty that any of us has in trying to judge facts, causes and effects, and the relations of past and present to future in the political realm. Second, there is interpersonal distrust, or distrust of one's fellow citizens themselves. This arises from a citizen's uncertainty about how others' interests will affect his own vulnerabilities, and about how other citizens will see the relationship between their interests and his own. In order to dispel the first sort of distrust, which is caused simply by factual uncertainty, a speaker must give his audience good reason for trusting his facts and factual analyses. He must prove to his audience that his proposals to resolve particular problems are most likely to navigate future obstacles successfully. This is the first challenge a speaker faces. The problem of interpersonal distrust introduces three more challenges. A speaker must try to bring an element of predictability to the unstable world of human relations; he must tackle negative emotions like anger and resentment and try to convert them to goodwill; and above all else, he must prove that his approach to self-interest is trustworthy. In meeting these three challenges, the speaker addresses the ethical status of the proposed policy.

This distribution of effort—in which 75 percent of the work of political conversation is directed toward generating interpersonal trust among citizens—already makes the important point that in every political discussion, audiences are always judging not merely the pragmatic political issue under discussion—say, the most cost-effective way of providing health care—but also a speaker's commitment to developing relations among citizens and forms of reciprocity that justify trust.⁶ Decisions about how to handle health care must be satisfying on these grounds too. Logic, understood technically as demonstrative argument, is on its own insufficient to bring debate to a successful close in the deliberative forum. In fact, language equips us

with three distinctive capacities for meeting the challenges of distrust. They are our capacities (1) to make logical arguments, (2) to convey character, and (3) to engage the emotions of our audience. A speaker's display of character or her response to an audience's emotions does not involve her in irrational speech. Aristotle's important point is that reason, properly understood, extends beyond arguments about natural facts (say, historical or physical facts), and even beyond arguments about universal or universalizable principles. Reason extends beyond such subject matter as can be handled by demonstrative logic and also has the job of helping us draw conclusions about how people are likely to treat others. These are conclusions about human probabilities. What is the probability that a speaker is telling the truth when she introduces facts to support her arguments? Is another speaker likely to act in accord with the general principles he espouses? How likely is it that the fear that still another speaker inspires accurately anticipates some evil that may come from her proposal? A speaker's words, all of them, including those used in her logical arguments about facts, causes, and effects, also provide information about a speaker's reliability and about whether circumstances obtain to justify particular emotions. This information about probabilities also belongs to the domain of reason, regardless of whether the words that convey it are part of a logical syllogism crafted by the speaker. Even words dropped casually into speech can trigger syllogisms in the listener. I offer a crude example that makes the point easy to see. An audience member who hears a slur against her ethnic group will distrust the speaker, and her distrust rides on the following syllogistic thought: "Speakers who use ethnic slurs are not likely to take the interests of the slurped group to heart; the speaker has just made a slur against my group; she is therefore not likely to take the interests of my group to heart." The project of persuasion depends on speakers' recognizing the rationality involved in ordinary, human judgments about the probable behavior of others.

How, then, do our three speech capacities—to make logical arguments, to convey character, and to engage emotions—combine to dispel both the distrust caused by factual uncertainty and interpersonal distrust? When I raise this question to students, they often leap excitedly to the conclusion that we use demonstrative logic to deal with factual uncertainty and other speech techniques to convey char-

acter and respond to our audience's emotions. If only matters were so tidy! In fact, demonstrative argument can do relatively little about a lack of factual clarity. Take the case of a country facing decisions about whether and how to go to war. More often than not, even when it has made its irrevocable decision, facts, probabilities, and likelihoods remain murky. Regardless of how logical (in the technical sense) are the arguments for or against war, which are inevitably strung together from only the few facts that can be publicly agreed upon, they will not in themselves convince an audience that a speaker has an accurate, credible analysis of the future. In political controversies, there will always be logical arguments for a counterposition, on the basis of exactly the same facts. In this circumstance, no amount of logical argument will determine which speaker to trust. Audiences will turn to assessments of character, and so our capacity to convey our habitual mindsets turns out to be directed not merely at concerns about interpersonal relations, but also at the distrust arising from factual uncertainty. But in what sense is character relevant to this type of distrust?

People trust those who have the ability to make astute, pragmatically successful decisions in contexts of uncertainty and who can convey that practical levelheadedness through speech (R 2.6.17; cf. 2.6.21). Just as one prefers to be a passenger in a car whose driver processes large amounts of information quickly and can navigate an efficient, safe path through a world of constantly changing obstacles, so too one finds speakers persuasive who convey competence at practical reason in political affairs. For Aristotle, competence at practical reason is a character virtue—*phronêsis* in the Greek.⁷ And how does one know someone has this ability? For Aristotle, character virtues are a matter of habit. If a policy advocate has previously made nine good proposals out of nine attempts, the likelihood is that his tenth will also be good. A speaker who wishes to convince his audience that his policy proposal is likely to bring practical success would do well to find ways of conveying to his audience that he does have such habitual competence. This is not so much a matter of reciting one's record as of recounting at least some of the thought process involved in one's previous successful proposals. The point is to display to an audience that one's habitual thought processes lead to pragmatically successful endeavors. The question of character arises here to prompt an assessment not of a speaker's personal morality in general, but only

of the probable efficacy of his proposals. Where logic cannot dispel the distrust that arises from uncertainty about the future, arguments from character often can. Character judgments, when they focus on evaluating a speaker's competence at practical reason, are assessments of probability as to whether the proposed policy is likely to achieve success.⁸

This is not the only way that character affects persuasion. Clearly, audiences will distrust a speaker whose policy proposals are merely practicable. A proposal to save public funds by ceasing to collect garbage from the homes of the elderly may be practicable but meets obvious ethical objections. In conveying his character, a speaker reveals not only his decision-making habits but also the ethical commitments that guide his treatment of other people. This draws us away from the issue of factual uncertainty and into the area of interpersonal distrust. Much more might be said, and Aristotle does say much more, about how to dispel the distrust arising from factual uncertainty, but since my concern in this book is indeed with interpersonal trust, I turn now to that issue.

Once again, there is no neat correlation between our three different speech capacities and the types of distrust. In fact, a speaker's logical arguments are central to how she conveys her character, and this for two reasons. Aristotle recommends that speakers construct the logical element of their argument around general principles. His term is "maxims," and he offers as an example the proverb that "the true friend should love as if he were going to be a friend forever" (*Rhetoric* 2.21.14). For Aristotle, the principles one espouses express character. Demonstrative argument about general principles brings to the fore a speaker's ethical commitments concerning the treatment of others, allowing an audience to assess these principles easily and to decide whether they render a speaker reliable. But the use of general principles has another important effect too.

In advocating the use of maxims, Aristotle seems close to the Habermasian argument that speakers should always try to convert their opinions into universal or universalizable terms in order to test whether those arguments are good for everyone. In fact, he is less interested in universality than in the value of general principles for social stability. In using maxims, an Aristotelian speaker does not so much check whether her position is good for all as draw herself into

a contract with her audience in order to stabilize the future (the responses of her audience will tell her whether the principles are good for other people, too). Speakers who use universal principles—a language of eternity—indicate a willingness to fashion rules in the present that they too will have to abide by in the future; perhaps those rules will compromise those very speakers' interests in the future. This does not mean that a community's principles are set in stone after a public debate—only that those who have proposed particular principles have committed themselves to being judged by them at some future point, should other citizens choose to return to them. In using a language of eternity, and thereby accepting the possibility that her fellow citizens may one day use her own principle in cases where she will lose out, a speaker helps bring predictability to human relations and also accepts some degree of vulnerability before her fellows. In short, she embraces a rule-of-law approach to politics whereby decision-rules are decided in advance of the appearance of the cases to be decided by them, and she offers her audience an opportunity to set the content of those predetermined principles. The best test of a policy proposal is whether the principles on which it is based are consistent with the terms on which citizens can live together. Speakers who use generalizable rules draw a rule-of-law ethos beyond institutions into ordinary interactions and help bring predictability to human relations.

An example of the role of logical argument in clarifying ethical commitments, as distinct from factual claims, can be found in events surrounding the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Prior to March 2003, when the U.S. invaded in its first-ever application of the doctrine of preemptive strike, which the administration had put forward in its 2002 foreign policy statement, citizens and pundits debated whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and whether there was a connection between Iraq and the terrorist group Al-Qaeda. These were fairly fruitless arguments. The facts, had we been able to reach public agreement about them, would have mattered, but logical argument itself was unable to achieve factual clarity on these issues. On the contrary, these arguments generated ever-increasing levels of confusion about the pertinent facts. In contrast, citizens debated very little about whether the doctrine of preemptive strike is compatible with a democratic way of life, let alone the terms on which it might be compatible. If citizens and politicians had wanted to produce political stability, this

question should have been at the center of the debate. Logical argument often cannot clarify the facts of uncertain political situations, but it can always provide a public airing of communal standards and reinforce a rule-of-law culture.

A rule-of-law ethos cannot, however, simply be equated with a fixation on rules; it entails a more fundamental commitment to social predictability and to a limited but acknowledged vulnerability of citizens to each other. A rule-of-law ethos can therefore be drawn into ordinary relations even without the use of maxims or general principles. The events of the U.S. invasion of Iraq yield two odd, but useful, examples here. The British, important allies to the U.S., had been assigned the job of securing Basra, and in the war's immediate aftermath, generally did a much better job than the U.S. military in cultivating trust among hostile Iraqi citizens. Many commentators pointed this out, and attributed the British success to their army's experience with hostile civilians in Northern Ireland.⁹ Trust-generation, the commentators suggested, is a cultural habit.

What, then, did the British do to try to bring peace out of war? Upon capturing the headquarters of the ousted Baath party, they allowed local civilians to ransack it, contrary to standard procedure to halt all looting. The British soldiers had found a way to show symbolically that the arbitrariness of the ruling Baath party no longer held sway in Basra; not only were the British now in charge, but things would be counter to what they had been. In permitting the looting, the British allowed an exception because it confirmed a rule, and so the aim of this lawlessness was, ironically, to establish a rule-of-law ethos. Also, at a point when U.S. soldiers were still decked out in full armament, the British wore soft berets and shed their body armor, accepting some vulnerability to make the point that the time had come for peace. Both gestures—the blow struck to arbitrariness and their elected vulnerability—revealed a sophisticated relationship to rhetoric and display; both symbolic acts astutely conveyed the character of a rule-of-law culture, and in so doing might have served as foundation stones for rule-of-law institutions.

In the end, though, the British efforts at trust-generation had less success than anticipated. Similarly, even a speaker who has managed to deal with factual uncertainty, who has convinced his audience that his core principles are sound, and who has found ways to cultivate a

rule-of-law ethos, has by no means yet faced his most difficult challenges. He must still tackle negative emotions like anger, fear, and resentment. At the core of such emotions are problems of self-interest. Envy, indignation, and the like are often judgments on an important matter: do a speaker's interests clash or harmonize with those of his audience?

Many commentators have taken Aristotle's willingness to discuss the political impact of emotions as proof that rhetoric inevitably disintegrates into a sophistic manipulation of the passions. But, on the contrary, he frames his arguments by criticizing speakers who "warp" (*diastrephēin*) their auditors by rousing them to anger, envy, and pity. Also, he repeatedly insists that speakers prepare their audiences emotionally "in a certain way" (*poion tina kai ton krites kataskeuazein*), and then casts his discussion of the emotions as an analysis of goodwill (*eunoia*) and friendship (*philia*), saying, "It is necessary, with these discussions about the emotions, to take up the subject of goodwill and friendship" (R 2.1.7). The "certain way" in which audiences should be prepared is such that they are ready for the possibility that goodwill and friendship can arise between them and other citizens.

I want here to be precise about the role of each of these terms, friendship and goodwill, in the project of trust-production.¹⁰ Aristotle takes care to distinguish friendship, and also hatred, from the emotions. Both are habitual dispositions, or sets of practices for interacting with others, not passions.¹¹ Significantly, he concludes his discussion of friendship and hatred by remarking, "It is evident, then, from what we have just said that it is possible to prove (*apodeiknynai*) that men are enemies or friends, or to make them such if they are not; to refute those who pretend that they are, and when they oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them over to whichever side may be preferred" (R 2.4.32). This is the only passage in the discussion of the emotions that states what rhetoricians need to accomplish when they engage with the emotions, and the possibility of generating (or destroying) friendship is just what's at stake. Goodwill is the pivotal emotional element of this work, because it is an emotion that can arise between strangers and that paves the way for friendship. But to get to goodwill and then to friendship, a speaker needs to work principally with negative emotions.

The emotions, as Aristotle defines them, are pleasures and pains

(*lypai*) that, as they change, affect men's judgments (*krisis*) (R 2.2.1). These pleasures and pains mark moments when people's interests are either satisfied or left unfulfilled, and so emotion registers the effects of loss and sacrifice on politics. "All men rejoice when their desire comes to pass and are pained when the contrary happens; so that pains and pleasures are signs of their interest" (R 2.4.3). A speaker who seeks to inspire trust must be especially concerned with the pains, or losses. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle investigates ten specific emotions: anger, fear, shame, charity, pity, indignation, envy, emulation, mildness, and confidence. Notably, all but the last two are pains, or sympathetic responses to the pains of others. Nor are the two exceptions, mildness and confidence, pleasures exactly. Mildness is only the absence of pain (R 2.3.12), and confidence is the absence of the particular pains that characterize fear. Recognizing that anger, fear, and the other negative emotions on the list are the critical political passions, Aristotle teaches his speakers to deal with the impact of feelings of loss on politics by converting the negative emotions into these other two, mildness and confidence. This conversion is prior, even, to any effort to inspire the positive emotion of goodwill. How can such a conversion be accomplished? A question for our time.

Emotions have conceptual structures, as Aristotle argues; this is what makes it possible to intervene in them. Anger, for instance, differs from indignation in that the first arises when one gets less than one thinks is one's due; and the second, when someone else gets more than what one believes to be her due. People are talked into their feelings of loss insofar as their assessments of what they are owed rest on ideas about what is due to whom within their polity, and such ideas derive from discourse.¹² They can, therefore, be talked out of them. One can counteract the anger, for instance, by proving that no slight occurred, or that it was unintentional. One can assuage fear by revealing or creating safeguards. And for a range of the negative emotions, one can draw on the techniques of mourning.¹³ As Aristotle anatomizes the conceptual content of the negative emotions, he constructs a very precise taxonomy of political vulnerability. Speakers who succeed at dealing with the play of emotion in politics find ways to minimize that experience for others. But a speaker can begin the process of turning negative emotions first into mildness and then into goodwill only if she takes the time to identify precisely which ones

buoy up the distrust she intends to disarm. Which emotion is the problem precisely? Having answered this question, the speaker can then engage the conceptual content particular to that emotion.

Importantly, the negative emotions are pains that register not merely objective, but also "apparent," losses, to use Aristotle's terminology. Speakers always have to deal with exactly how painful a given proposal *appears* to their audience, regardless of their own beliefs about how much suffering their proposals in fact inflict. Citizens' idiosyncratic perceptions of events and beliefs about their due and that of others within their polity determine the intensity of their feelings of loss. Democratic citizens are obliged to recognize that even the subjective experience of loss is politically significant, for it establishes the extent of any given citizen's consent to a polity's policy. Although we may wish it otherwise, citizens can negotiate loss and generate trust only on the shifting ground of subjectivity.¹⁴ This does not mean that apparent losses and real losses should be treated in the same way. The first step in dealing with apparent losses is to make the case that the loss is only apparent. If citizens can be convinced on this account, the real pain they feel in respect to their apparent loss should shift in its nature; citizens would then deal with the remaining pain felt by their fellows on the terms necessary to it, whether through mourning techniques, techniques of reassurance, or other psychologically relevant responses.

Public negotiation even of apparent pains is crucial to democratic deliberation because it gives a community an opportunity to address inconsistencies in how different citizens think benefits, burdens, recognition, and agency should be distributed within the polity. Since these are the basic topics of justice, it is in addressing, and trying to resolve, negative emotions, that a citizen-speaker contributes most to refining his polity's account of justice. Only by addressing negative emotions with a view to generating goodwill can a citizen find the seeds of improved citizenly interactions and a more democratic approach to the problem of loss in politics. Citizens must, then, cultivate their capacities to identify the particular emotions at play in respect to any given political question as well as refining their understanding of how particular emotions can be dealt with. Here I have named only the emotions to which citizens must especially attend: anger, fear, shame, charity, pity, indignation, envy, emulation. Each has its own concep-

tual structure and requires a logical response fitted to that structure. For now, I leave it to citizens to study the particular content of each of these emotions independently, or with Aristotle.

Once a speaker has converted negative emotions to mildness, the next task is to convert mildness to goodwill. Goodwill is not friendship proper but only its first root. It blossoms into friendship only after it becomes mutual (*NE* 8.2.4, 9.5.3). The actual production of goodwill therefore involves two steps. A speaker must display her own goodwill to an audience, and then must inspire reciprocal goodwill in them.

How can a speaker prove his own willingness to befriend his fellow citizens? Here, since any willingness to be friends involves a desire to enter into real, and not merely juridical, peer relationships with one's fellow citizens, we return to the topic of freedom and equality. To prove that one speaks as a friend one must demonstrate a commitment to the equal autonomy of all citizens. As we saw, Aristotle began his treatise with the overarching point that a speaker must remember that it is the business of the audience to judge, not to learn. In essence, if a speaker is to know that his audience consists of judges rather than of passive and submissive students, he must check that the audience is not simply suffering in silence while being told what to do. It is evidently to this end that Aristotle recommends that speakers be willing to let anybody whom the people choose judge their speeches (*R* 3.16). Citizens who are political friends do not stray into patronizing their fellow citizens. They are willing to share power with their audiences and to make themselves vulnerable to them. This was the important message of the soft berets worn by the British in Iraq. They chose unnecessary, conspicuous vulnerability in order to prove themselves trustworthy. In political deliberation, Aristotle requires that citizens accept being vulnerable before the judgment of *any* of their fellow citizens, even those of diverse social classes and backgrounds.¹⁵

The requirement that speakers submit to the judgment of any randomly chosen audience member has another important effect, too. It forces speakers to ask themselves whether their narratives will seem to everyone a convincing account of reality. The willingness to be judged by anyone whatsoever cultivates in citizen-speakers the regular habit of checking how different proposals look from perspectively differentiated positions within the citizenry. This habit is crucial to

generating trust, because citizens generate goodwill when they can prove that they are concerned to address the whole citizenry and not merely the 50 percent plus one whom they need to carry a vote. This technique helps reduce the play of negative emotions in politics by anticipating and avoiding them. The speaker who checks how a proposal will look from all the perspectively differentiated positions within the citizenry explores the problem of loss in advance of the imposition of losses on particular people, and deals with it directly. Citizen-speakers should be vigilant not to induce a feeling of political vulnerability in their audience; and to deal effectively with negative political emotions, they must both anticipate how their proposals will sound to their diverse fellow citizens and also develop their willingness to be judged by any fellow citizen.

Again, I will offer a small success story that reveals the connection between anticipating negative political feelings by listening to the whole of one's audience and successfully dealing with those emotions. In 2002 Los Angeles hired, as its chief of police, Bostonian William Bratton who was credited with "kicking" crime in New York during his time as police commissioner there from 1994 to 1996. When he got to LA, he decided to tackle gangs, and to quote the *Economist*, immediately "declared 'war' promising to take back the streets" (March 22–28, 2003, 30) This was his mistake. When he began to cultivate his "many constituencies," talking to rich folk in restaurants but also spending time at churches and with neighborhood organizations in Central Los Angeles (as the city has renamed notorious South Central), the people in Central L.A. told him "that talk of 'war' was not a good tactic." One makes war only on those with whom one will not share a polity; to declare war on a neighborhood or set of citizens is tantamount to banishing them. The point of the term is to intimidate and produce political vulnerability. Bratton rightly dropped the term and as a result has gained some trust to make his job easier. The *Economist* concluded its report by saying, "If Mr. Bratton is to win the approval of LA's honest citizens, he will have to teach his officers the lesson he learned himself—less war and more jaw" (*ibid.*). To provoke or assuage people's sense of vulnerability is learned behavior. Cops, too, learn how to succeed or fail at trust production, and public diplomacy is as necessary at home as abroad.

Now, to the final, crucial question. Having proved her goodwill

toward her audience, how does a speaker also inspire others to feel goodwill? Here the main challenge is to prove that one's approach to self-interest is trustworthy. This is the most fundamental element of trust generation and the task that Aristotle prioritizes. Above all else goodwill springs up, he argues, in response to a display of equity (*epi-keia*) (9.6.4). As we have seen, an equitable person displays the generosity of friendship and is "content to receive a smaller share although he has the law on his side" (NE 5.10.8). Here we are again, at the need not only for flexibility but even for sacrifice. Equity is the core of friendship and also of trust production. A speaker's equitability shows that her own interest in preserving her community has led her to moderate her other interests. This display allays an audience's distrust of the speaker's self-interest, from which all of the most politically corrosive distrust arises. The British in Basra are said to have captured a high-ranking Iraqi officer in the middle of the street with a crowd of boys around. They found beside him in his vehicle a significant stash of Iraqi cash. Rather than turn it in to their own officers, according to standard procedure, the soldiers distributed the cash to the boys. They were buying them, yes, but the soldiers were also showing that their own self-interest did not extend so far as to override the boys' self-interest. The soldiers were advertising themselves as people who employ equitable, not rivalrous, self-interest. This is the basic move required for generating trust.

Of course, we have already encountered a significant example of this move. As we have seen, an exemplary sacrifice, like Elizabeth Eckford's, declares a context of equitability, not rivalry, to obtain. Aristotle has a word for the ability to be good at such acts of equity. It is *sugnomé*. Usually translated as forgiveness, *sugnomé* more literally means "judging with" (NE 6.11.1). "Forgiveness" captures only the form of equity that operates in the judicial realm, when a prosecutor requests or a judge imposes a lesser penalty than the law allows. "Judging with" in the deliberative context is less forgiveness than the ability sometimes to argue for or to accept a decision that, to some degree, goes against one's own interests or is even less than one's due. Speakers need not shed their private interests when they advocate policies, but they must prove that they have in the past been and will again in the future be willing to accept decisions that benefit themselves less than others.¹⁶ If a speaker openly takes less than his legal

share now and then, he will generate goodwill in his audience. The key to generating trust is, above all else, an ability to prove that one governs one's life by equitable, not rivalrous, self-interest.

But the game of generating trust does not end with that sacrifice. If all else fails and a citizen is unable to talk his audience around to mildness and confidence, he can always make a signal sacrifice. Indeed, in contexts where trust has completely disintegrated, someone has to go first, as did Elizabeth. No single act of sacrifice can, however, complete the work of generating trust until its audience reciprocates. To quote Aristotle again, "A friend is one who befriends and is befriended in return, and those who think their relationship is of this character consider themselves friends" (R 2.4.7; emphasis added).

Political friendship must be reciprocal, and Elizabeth Eckford's sacrifice was at last converted from a symptom of domination into an act of equity only when it became clear that her fellow citizens around the country would reciprocate her self-sacrifice by accepting changes to their political regime. Had they not reciprocated, people in positions like Elizabeth's would have had further grounds to distrust their fellow citizens.¹⁷ People who offer up sacrifices do not do it for nothing; they always aim to engage equitable reciprocity, and at the very least, like Jeppiah's daughter, implicitly expect to earn honor, gratitude, and respect.

Aristotle might, with his stress on equity, friendship, and reciprocity, seem to set even more utopian standards for his speakers than do the deliberative democrats of chapter 5, but, to the contrary, his recommendations are embedded not in an argument about what citizens *ought* to do, but instead in an argument about what democratic persuasion demands for success. No decent judge, he argues, would consent to an argument in which a speaker does not establish a rule-of-law ethos, display equity, and cultivate goodwill in addition to making logical arguments. His rules for persuasion also constitute a theory of the grounds for reasonable consent, and so his *Art of Rhetoric* is as much a guide for listeners, who give or withhold their consent, as for speakers.¹⁸ Equity comes into existence in the interaction between speaker and listener.

Equity is so important to Aristotle because no agreement can ever be equally good for all citizens, reconciling all their various interests and outlooks. No political decision can garner ardor from every cit-

izen. To make consensus politics possible, democratic citizens need ways to consider those communal decisions that do not go in their favor as nonetheless decisions to which they can consent. The idea that one consents even to those decisions that go against one's own interests, out of political friendship for the good of the other, makes such decisions products of an autonomous choice for everyone, and not tyrannical constraints on one's freedom. Rhetoric, understood as the art of talking to strangers as equals and of proving that one has also their good at heart, inspires the trust that provides a consent-based regime with the flexibility needed to garner, from citizens of diverse backgrounds, consent to decisions made in uncertainty.

A final, surprising twist remains, however, before this account of the techniques for producing trust is complete. Aristotle encourages his citizens to cultivate goodwill, but in his view, goodwill does not arise "in friendships of utility and pleasure," the two lowest and least taxing levels of friendship (*NE* 9.5.1). Yet citizens are, in fact, utility friends, by his own account. Has he set us to pursuing a phantom?

No. We have sought an appropriate goal. Aristotle places the effort to cultivate goodwill at the center of his art of talking to strangers because it matters what kinds of aspirations citizens have. Citizenly relations are not stable but change over time. Sometimes trust is increasing, or at least being renewed; sometimes, instead, it is corroding. A polity will never reach a point where all its citizens have intimate friendships with each other, nor would we want it to. The best one can hope for, and all one should desire, is that political friendship can help citizens to resist the disintegration of trust and achieve a community where trust is a renewable resource. But to accomplish this, citizens must set their sights on what lies beyond their reach: goodwill throughout the citizenry. If they do, here and there citizens who were perfect strangers to each other will become friends simply by acting as if they were friends. More important, however, even in the vast majority of cases where citizens do not become intimates, they will at least have achieved a guiding orientation that will help make them more trustworthy to each other. Our aspirations determine the nature of the failures amid which we have to live.

We have, at last, found a new mode of citizenship in friendship understood as not an emotion but a practice. One can use its techniques even with strangers and even in the absence of emotional at-

tachments, as in utilitarian friendships like business relations and most other relations among citizens. Political friendship consists finally of trying to be *like* friends. Its payoff is rarely intimate, or genuine, friendship, but it is often trustworthiness and, issuing from that, political trust. Its art, trust production, has long gone by the abused name of rhetoric. Properly understood, rhetoric is not a list of stylistic rules but an outline of the radical commitment to other citizens that is needed for a just democratic politics. The rest is a set of suggestions about how to turn those commitments into real politics. At this point, we might as well equip ourselves with a list.

In order to generate trust, a speaker should

- aim to convince 100 percent of her audience; if she finds herself considering rather how to carry a majority, she is acting in a fashion that over the long term will undermine democracy;
- test herself by speaking to minority constituents whose votes she does not need;
- once she has found the limits of her ability to persuade, she should think also about how to ameliorate the remaining disagreement and distrust;
- "separate the people from the problem" by (i) developing external standards and universal principles for assessing problems and (ii) recognizing that dealing with the people means engaging with specific features of their subjective situation;
- be precise about which emotions are at stake in a particular conversation;
- seek to transform conditions of utility into experiences of goodwill;
- recognize that reciprocity is established over time and that enough trust has to be generated to allow this process to proceed;
- recognize that the most powerful tool for generating trust is the capacity to prove that she is willing to make sacrifices even for the strangers in her polity;
- be aware too that she is trustworthy only if she can point to a *habit* of making sacrifices for strangers and not merely to a single instance;¹⁹
- recognize that where there is no trust, a great sacrifice will be necessary to sow the first seeds of trust, which can develop only

over time through repeated interactions in which citizens have opportunities to test each other;

— give her audience opportunities for judging (accepting or rejecting) her arguments;

— be willing to have any member of the polity respond to her arguments.

In order to prepare the way for the generation of trust, a listener should

— separate a speaker's claims about facts from the principles on which her conclusions are based; assess both;

— ask whether a speaker has a history of making pragmatically correct decisions;

— ask who is sacrificing for whom, whether the sacrifices are voluntary, and honored; whether they can and will be reciprocated;

— ask whether the speaker has spoken as a friend;

— insist on opportunities to judge political arguments;

— judge.

Here then are some new habits to try on.²⁰ Rhetoric is relevant not only in the halls of the legislature and in the courtrooms but wherever any stranger has to convince another of anything. Any interaction among strangers can generate trust that the polity needs in order to maintain its basic relationships. If citizens keep in mind these guidelines for speaking and listening to their fellow citizens, they will import the expertise of ordinary friendship into the political realm, and political friendship will grow out of that. Political friendship thus generated sustains a democratic polis by helping citizens to accept decisions with which they may disagree. But friendship must be mutual.

Self-sacrifice serves the political purpose of enabling and legitimating agreement only when citizens act generously toward other citizens exactly because they know that at some point they will find themselves befriended in return. If one citizen or group repeatedly lives with less than its legal share, political friendship has been violated, or has never existed. Indeed, decisions that impose continuous sacrifice are based not on persuasion but on force and are therefore illegitimate. Since democratic citizenship entails turn-taking at displays of equity, democracy will be stronger for cultivating in citizens an ability to talk to strangers in ways that support taking turns.

And yet . . . again the skeptic's voice rises: one can employ practices like these in the supermarket, at the movies, in airports, at bus stands, at the workplace. But why should one believe that they will have an impact? One might even teach rhetoric to kids. But aren't the words of politicians the only ones with power to transform our world? In what sense can ordinary citizens be said to be powerful? How can their techniques of political friendship have real political effects?



Epilogue: Powerful Citizens

"DON'T TALK TO STRANGERS!" That is a lesson for four-year-olds. Eyes that drop to the ground when they bump up against a stranger's gaze belong to those still in their political minority. If the experience of the most powerful citizen in the United States is any guide, talking to strangers is empowering; the president is among the few citizens for whom the polity holds no intimidating strangers. Presidents greet everyone and look all citizens in the eye. This is not merely because they are always campaigning, but because they have achieved the fullest possible political maturity. Their ease with strangers expresses a sense of freedom and empowerment. At one end of the spectrum of styles of democratic citizenship cowers the four-year-old in insecure isolation; at the other, stands the president, strong and self-confident. The more fearful we citizens are of speaking to strangers, the more we are docile children and not prospective presidents; the greater the distance between the president and us, the more we are subjects, not citizens. Talking to strangers is a way of claiming one's political majority and, with it, a presidential ease and sense of freedom.

Talking to strangers has not been the traditional way of claiming one's political majority. During much of the last century, the other option for most citizens was to assimilate into the "white majority." Countless immigrants of assorted ethnic backgrounds and speaking diverse languages found that this was the route not to political maturity exactly but at least to a satisfying sense of security. At the very least, assimilating into the white majority increased one's chances of being

trusted by other members of that majority, and trust, as social capital, is very easily converted into material security.¹ "This country gives you the chance to become a very highly respected citizen, become wealthy or succeed," wrote a man born in a European slum in a letter to the editor published in the *Los Angeles Times* on September 13, 1957, alongside a letter on the Little Rock desegregation crisis. For the path into the majority to be visible, the country also needed a visibly permanent "minority group" or long-lived opposition group of low political status.

The growth of de facto and de jure segregation of people of color throughout the first half of the twentieth century served many purposes and had many damaging effects, but among them was the solidification of the ideas of majority and minority. The use of the term "minority" to refer to an individual person rather than to that percentage of a group which loses a vote is a modern invention—more particularly, a U.S. invention.² This usage is possible only when a minority voting group appears to be permanently in a position of reduced political power, for otherwise it would be senseless to refer to an individual as a "minority"; in a fluid democracy any citizen may be one day in the minority, and the next in the majority. But used thus, to designate an individual, the term "minority" names someone at whom a member of the majority can look and know that that "minority" probably has less power in the polity, all in all, than she does. For the first half of the twentieth century, African Americans were invisible as individual democratic agents because they were so very visible as less than that. To become a member of "the majority" was to acquire the privilege of looking at others as permanent minorities.

Strength and confidence issue from this kind of claim to political majority, but not freedom. This idea of political majority that entails assimilation depends on the visible apartness of minority citizens, and it takes work to keep a set of citizens apart so that they see themselves, over the long term, as a unified, oppositional group. But maintaining the apartness of minority citizens means also that majority citizens have to stay away from them. This approach to political majority sets limits on where majority citizens can go and to whom they can speak. In the twentieth century, this segregation of majority citizens was enforced less by laws than by an indefatigable psychological policing that constantly reminded them that their claim to political majority de-

ended on their remaining apart and distinct from "minorities." The continuing power of this isolation is evident in that white Americans rarely think of themselves as related by ancestry to black Americans, whereas I wonder about every white person I meet in the United States with the last name of "Allen." The prison is not small for those citizens who continue to choose assimilation to achieve political majority, but it is confining still. The traditional method of achieving political majority depends on a fear of strangers.

When the United States was reconstituted between 1954 and 1964, its redirection toward integration began the long, slow end of its durable minority group. To dissolve the durable minority would, however, also disband the durable majority. When Schlesinger and others lament the "balkanization" of the U.S. citizenry, they register only the passing of the "white majority," which had long erased differences among a variety of Eastern European, as well as other "white," ethnicities via the opposition to "black." We are not experiencing the end of social bonds, but only, at last, the small first death tremors of the ideas of "the majority group" and "the permanent minority." But disbanding the idea of the majority group also strips many citizens of that feature of their identity that has always provided them with their most stable, if unacknowledged, source of social and political security.

A letters-to-the editor page from the September 12, 1957, *Chicago Tribune* nicely captures the psychological complexities of the project of integration. The letters mostly respond to the issue of school desegregation in Arkansas, with two exceptions. The first anomalous letter concerns the safety of children. A fifteen-year-old girl had been murdered, and the letter-writer advises her compatriots that "[t]his crime and many other crimes against girls would be avoided if parents did not allow teen-age daughters on the streets alone at night." Most notable about the page is the movement in theme from one letter to the next. An editor laid it out, choosing the order for the letters, constructing the rhythms and patterns in the imagination of hypothetical citizens reflecting on integration in September 1957. The thematic movement is from thoughts on integration, to worries about personal security, to further meditations on integration, to more anxiety about personal security. You could call it a nervous tic.

The first letter responds to a *Tribune* editorial criticizing Arkansas's

Governor Faubus for using his state's National Guard troops to keep the Little Rock Nine out of Central High. The second letter, entitled "Integration in Chicago," responds to another editorial from a few days earlier, entitled "Chicago's Record in Race Relations." This letter-writer takes up the editorial's claim that "a Negro can walk anywhere in Chicago and not be molested," and advocates the expansion of this freedom of movement for Negroes. "That is not much of an achievement. If whites would like to aid the so-called Negro problem, they could do so quickly just by letting qualified Negroes live in the vacant apartments all over the city. One Negro family in a block is not going to hurt anybody." Right after this letter, about the free movement of Negroes through formerly segregated space, we get the letter about children's safety. And the letter about teaching children not to go out alone at night and, implicitly, not to talk to strangers, is then followed by a letter disputing the claim that Negroes can go anywhere in Chicago unmolested. "Mayor Daley has never, to our knowledge, used even the moral force of his office to suggest to the perpetrators of racial violence that their conduct is vile, unlawful, and ungodly." Then, the final letter on the page takes up the topic of "Travelers Aid" and "helping travelers in trouble." Like the letter about protecting children, this one registers worries about personal security in public spaces.

The idea of integration that recommends letting "Negroes live in vacant apartments all over the city" produces the anxiety and insecurity expressed in the letter about keeping kids off the streets. And then the movement repeats itself. The editorial organization of the letters reveals this social logic: once Negroes can leave their ghettos and go anywhere safely, the beginning of the end of the permanent minority, and so of the permanent majority, is at hand; the security these social ideas had always provided to many citizens was shaken by this horizon of expectation. When Negroes can go anywhere, those who wish, even unconsciously, to maintain the psychological security that comes from being a member of the permanent majority have to limit the ambit of their own movements. To keep their sense of well-being, they have to set themselves apart.

The *Oxford English Dictionary* dates to 1951 the use of the word "minority" to refer to an individual; neither the 1953 edition of the *American College Dictionary* nor the 1961 *Webster's New World Dictio-*

nary registers this meaning of the word. This usage is a product of the end of de jure segregation; it reflects a development from a legal to a psychological defense of the idea of the permanent majority.³ For many citizens, the beginning of the end of that majority has brought a diminishment of the power and security that they or their parents once experienced. This feeling of diminishment is based, however, not on real reductions in power or safety, but on the disintegration of those psychological props that had long provided a fake, but satisfying, sense of security.⁴ The remarkable retreat to gated communities, SUVs, and now Hummers is not a response to real crime rates but rather to the psychological effect of lost social certainty. Those who claim their political majority with such psychological props get at best the security of the fearful, and not the self-confidence of a mature democrat.

I advocate talking to strangers as a healthy path to political majority and seek to cultivate modes of citizenship that provide citizens with the security and self-confidence of full-fledged political agency. I have offered only a sketch of political friendship as a timely mode of citizenship, but in the process I have tried to undo two notions currently credited as common sense. First, citizenship is not, fundamentally, a matter of institutional duties but of how one learns to negotiate loss and reciprocity. Second, unrestrained self-interest does not make the world go round but corrodes the bases of trust. In fact, self-interest ranges through a myriad of forms from rivalrous to equitable. The ability to adopt equitable self-interest in one's interactions with strangers is the only mark of a truly democratic citizen, and to employ the techniques of political friendship would be to transform our daily habits and so our political culture. Can we devise an education that, rather than teaching citizens not to talk to strangers, instead teaches them how to interact with them self-confidently?⁵

Urban planners have long understood that architectural designs affect whether spaces feel safe enough for citizens to speak to each other. Taking Ellsion's *Invisible Man* as a guiding spirit, Marshall Berman describes his ideal "open-minded" public plaza, square, or mall thus:

It would be open, above all, to encounters between people of different classes, races, ages, religions, ideologies, cultures, and stances to-

ward life. It would be planned to attract all these different populations, to enable them to look each other in the face, to listen, maybe to talk. It would have to be exciting enough and accessible enough (by both mass transit and car) to attract them all, spacious enough to contain them all (so they wouldn't be forced to fight each other for breathing space), with plenty of exit routes (in case encounters get too strained), and adequate police (in case there's trouble) kept well in the background (so they don't themselves become a source of trouble).⁶

Berman realizes, as did Aristotle, that most of us take positive pleasure from living among strangers. They are, more often than not, a source of wonder to us, and wonder is (as Aristotle put it) the beginning of philosophy. Strangers help feed the human desire to learn. Nonetheless, strangers also raise fears that are sometimes justified; security is and always will be a real political issue. How should we handle it?

These days our instinct is to vote for more police or, as in the Berman quotation, secret police. Yet experience suggests that, while strengthened penal regimes enhance cooperation when people distrust each other, they also destroy trust where it already exists.⁷ Berman does not, nor would any other urban planner, rely exclusively on police to make a space feel safe enough for fruitful interactions among strangers; open public space in a police state is, paradoxically, an oxymoron. Any city-dweller knows that streets are safer the more they are occupied by ordinary folk, and in recent years urban planners have designed benches, fountains, lighting systems, maps and well-marked pathways, making spaces both inviting and easy to leave, in order to encourage us out of our houses and back to interaction. What is true of urban planners applies also to all democratic citizens. If we rely too heavily on police oversight to shape our public spaces, we fail at our jobs. We will have acquired modes of citizenship appropriate to a police state, and so will have undermined the very ideas of public space, and also of democracy. Like urban planners, citizens, too, have a panoply of instruments, other than policing, available for creating a public life worthy of a democracy. How can we now find modes for interacting with strangers that simultaneously enhance security and improve the quality of our interactions?

First, there are small steps to help achieve a basic sense of physical

safety. An urban planner builds exit routes into public space. An ordinary citizen can move through her world with heightened attentiveness to exits and options and determine which spaces are safe enough for talking to strangers. An urban planner tries to build watchful eyes into the background of urban space. An ordinary citizen can develop greater sensitivity to who is where around him and to whether there are enough trustworthy eyes nearby to provide a safe opportunity for conversation with a stranger. There will be times when one needs to cross the street for safety's sake; the question is how one does it. On a street late at night, when there aren't other watchful eyes around, it's better to cross sooner, rather than scurrying away at the last minute; it's better, if possible, to change one's route, instead of simply crossing to the other side. Our methods, even of crossing streets for safety's sake, signal to others what we think of them. One needs to display to strangers, as much as possible, that one is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt, and one must present oneself, too, such that one earns the benefit of their doubt. To cross early is to leave open the possibility that one has crossed for reasons unrelated to the stranger's approach; that possibility gives the stranger a chance not to take personally the fact that one has crossed the street. Democratic trust depends on public displays of an egalitarian, well-intentioned spirit.

I wish in no way to minimize everyone's need for security from violence but am also convinced that we have resources available to achieve security that extend well beyond policing. These resources reside in how we interact with strangers, for we can turn these interactions themselves into a source of strength. Through interaction, even as strangers, citizens draw each other into networks of mutual responsibility. Engage a stranger in conversation as a political friend and, if one gets a like return, one has gained a pair of watchful eyes to increase the safety of the space one occupies. Engage a stranger in conversation across a racial, ethnic, or class divide and one gets not only an extra pair of eyes but also an ability to see and understand parts of the world that are to oneself invisible. Real knowledge of what's outside one's garden cures fear, but only by talking to strangers can we come by such knowledge. Wisdom about the world we currently inhabit generally can't be gotten from books, because they can't be written, or read, fast enough. Strangers are the best source. Take

Socrates as an example. He gave living form to the injunction "Know thyself" by talking freely with anyone, Athenian or foreign, he came upon. A direct approach to curing one's fear of strangers would be to try especially hard to engage in conversation those strangers who come from worlds and places one fears.

I am no stranger to frightening personal attacks but have found ways of increasing my sense of security as I move about public spaces to such a degree that strangers are now for me a remarkable source of pleasure, and not fear. Beyond that, they are a source of empowering knowledge that enables me to move through the world freely and to roam widely. This personal self-confidence is one of the great rewards of claiming one's political majority by talking to strangers.

Political self-confidence is the other great reward. Citizens have powers to affect their world that extend well beyond their ability to dial 911. The cultivation of an ethos of political friendship depends on citizens' recognition of these powers, and their commitment to employ them, rather than police, to shape their environments.

Why should one believe that political friendship can affect politics and not merely an individual's personal experience of the public realm? As political candidates know, each interaction with a stranger holds the seeds of a transformation, and each of us already has far more political power within our grasp than we acknowledge or allow. For that matter, all democratic citizens, even nonvoters, are already more engaged in politics than they realize.

The bills of federal and state legislatures are not the only laws that structure life. A host of publicly binding decisions—some written, others customary—arise from public institutions like schools, churches, media outlets, and businesses to set the terms of our cohabitation. Political representation occurs not merely when Congress-folk gather. I recently heard a flight attendant ask "those *lucky* people in first class" to put away their footrests. Anyone who offers citizens narratives of who they are, how their political world works, and what its structuring principles are acts as a representative, and such representation is carried out not only in schools, churches, and businesses, but also in newspapers, movie theaters, and even airplanes. Our participation in assorted institutions, like our choices about what to read and watch

and how to speak about ourselves, shapes our political world. Insofar as a commitment to political friendship might change our institutional choices and our communal narratives, it would also transform our politics.

Let me put us in step a final time with the Invisible Man, who came to a similar understanding of the parochialness of law and representation. After his arrival in New York, his search for work, and a disastrous stint at a paint factory, he wanders lost in thought through Harlem's wintry streets until an eviction scene startles him out of himself. An elderly couple and all their belongings have been ejected into the snow. When he sees, amid their stuff, a photograph of the couple in their youth, "look[ing] back at [him] as though even then in that nineteenth century day they had expected little, and this with a grim unillusioned pride that suddenly seemed to me both a reproach and warning" (*IM* 271), he is inspired to give his first speech to the general public. He argues for conformity to the law and, wanting to keep the angry crowd from attacking the police, he tries to provoke his audience to think about law's place in democracy. As he does so, he realizes that citizens establish rules for themselves in moments of enforcement, like the eviction, as well as of legislation. When his first call for acquiescence to the law fails, he switches tactics, shouting out that, in accordance with the law, the crowd should undertake a cleanup campaign to "clear . . . the sidewalk of junk," by putting the elderly couple's possessions back in the house. He has suddenly understood law's fluidity and seen an opportunity to reinvent social forms even within law's confines. The crowd takes him up on this proposal, and so his imagination thwarts a simple move to violence by reinterpreting, even if euphemistically, legal possibilities.

The Invisible Man's reinterpretive work engages the officers too. The crowd's anger at them had surged when an officer had refused the old woman's request to go inside with her Bible for just long enough to pray. I. M. shouts to the angry crowd:

Look at them [the officers] but remember that we're a wise, law-abiding group of people. And remember it when you look up there in the doorway at *that law standing there with his forty-five*. Look at him, standing with his blue steel pistol and his blue serge suit, or one forty-five, you see ten for every one of us, ten guns and ten warm suits and

ten fat bellies and ten million laws. *Laws* that's what we call them down South! Laws! And we're wise and law-abiding. . . . How about it Mr. Law? Do we get our fifteen minutes worth of Jesus? You got the world, can we have our Jesus? (*IM* 278; some emphasis added)

Little laws, and not just constitutional ones, construct the world. In this scene, an invisible citizen proposes a renegotiation of losses and benefits in a moment of enforcement. He affirms law in general—the existence of collective agreements that turn conflicting narratives into a common world—but denounces a particular distribution of loss and benefit (“You got the world, can we have our Jesus?”), and invites the officers to join an experiment in imaginative reciprocity. Their flexibility about fifteen minutes of prayer might at least acknowledge a general need to reconsider how goods and harms are distributed in the polity. But the officers, who stand before the crowd as “the law,” falsely claim to have no opportunity for judgment. Once again they refuse to allow the old woman into the house to pray: “I got my orders. Mac, the man called, waving the pistol with a sneer” (*IM* 278). Soon after, however, the police send in a riot call. A white man helping to move the furniture back into the house responds, “What riot? There’s no riot,” and the officer tells him, “If I say there’s a riot, there’s a riot.” The officer then admits that his own judgment factors into the production of law. His phone call represents the world and establishes policy.

Law finally becomes what it is—in on-the-ground experience—through the interactions among citizens. In Mark Warren’s words, “[e]ven the most explicit set of laws or administrative rules is almost always insufficient to organize a collective action. Ultimately, collective action depends upon the good will of the participants, their shared understandings, their common interests, and their skilled attention to contingencies.”⁸ Law is not an *artifact*, or made object, that embodies the one will of the people once and for all, but a *practice* in which any and every citizen may be involved at any moment, through deliberation, legislation, or enforcement. As citizens deal with the contingencies attendant on law’s enforcement, they renegotiate loss and sacrifice constantly. This is the core activity of the practice of law. Since negotiating loss comes neither easily nor instinctively, citizens’ success at it depends entirely on whether they have built up

habits for it. Citizens who cultivate their own desire to prove themselves trustworthy to others, and who develop into habits the techniques for doing this, will acquire the rich reservoirs of political imagination that are needed for generating democratic agreement amid strife. Cultural abilities at trust cultivation within a citizenry intersect with more formal political procedures in this regard. They vastly increase the number of possible solutions imagined in any dispute. If the officers in the eviction scene had desired to prove themselves trustworthy, or had understood that cultivating trust would make their own jobs easier in the future, they would have let the old woman into the house to pray. The modicum of trust implied by this gesture might at a later point have facilitated a more substantive political discussion between police and residents. Instead, the police reduced the possibility of future conversation.

Political friendship (which finds its tools in the art of rhetoric) cultivates habits of imagination that generate politically transformative experiences out of ordinary interactions among strangers. Herein lies its power. To be a good rhetorician, one must see oneself as strangers do. The effort to do so entails understanding how one is implicated in strangers’ lives, and how calculi of goods and ills look different from other experiential positions. Ellison argued, “I believe . . . that unless we continually explore . . . the network of complex relationships which bind us together, we [will] continue being the victims of various inadequate conceptions of ourselves, both as individuals and as citizens of a nation of diverse people” (*CE* 523).⁹ If democratic citizens ignore the intricacy of their relationships, they will constantly produce public decisions that obscure the truth about what citizens demand of each other. Such decisions rest on domination more than justice, and over time blindness to patterns of imposition corrodes political legitimacy. Political friends remain attentive to the losses and benefits that constantly circulate through the citizenry, and they remain vigilant that this circulation not settle into patterns of domination that precipitate distrust. To develop a cultural habit of such friendship would transform our political world.

Whether any one citizen who makes political friendship an individual habit will noticeably affect our political world in the near term depends entirely on that citizen’s ability to imagine ways to extend the

impact of her political friendship beyond her particular interactions with other citizens. I began this book by directing our political attention away from institutions and toward habits of citizenship, but when a citizen wishes to cultivate her dream citizenship throughout the polis she is obliged to confront institutions once again. Institutions are ossified versions of particular patterns of human interaction, and they inevitably extend the reach and force of the cultural norms around which they are shaped. A shift in how people interact will inevitably also transform their institutions, just as when the snail changes direction, its shell turns too. But the cultivation of new cultural habits is not the only way to reorient institutions. They can also be reconfigured by intentional policy; a body constituted to amplify the effect of one set of norms in the world may reconstitute itself so as to amplify another set of norms. A citizen who wishes to extend the reach of her own practice of political friendship will have to engage with the institutions in which she participates. Do they act like political friends? If not, what might bring them closer to that ideal? I return to Ellison's wise remark that "[t]his society is not likely to become free of racism, thus it is necessary for Negroes to free themselves by becoming their idea of what a free people should be." All citizens who desire to live in a democracy that has slipped the shackles of domination and acquiescence must embody their idea of what a free people should be. This means pushing the institutions that one inhabits to embody this norm too, for they are extensions of our selves, as is the shell to the snail.

How, then, might a citizen undertake the construction of political friendship? Perhaps we should begin modestly. Aristotle drew some tentative conclusions about the size of a community in which one can act as a political friend. He concluded that the maximum number of people with whom one can actively be political friends is 99,999 fellow citizens. What if we did (with an ironic wink) take this number seriously? How would it be practical to be a political friend to 99,999 other adults, even those living in our own vicinity? First, one would require maps and recent census figures in order to figure out the geographical boundaries around one's home or place of work that enclose 99,999 adults. And then the citizen would have to get down to

the business of political friendship at a minimum in this terrain. She could call it her "polis."

Let me take myself as an example. I work at the University of Chicago and live nearby in a neighborhood called Hyde Park (51st to 59th Streets, Cottage Grove to Lake Michigan). My colleagues, neighbors, and I also consider a second upper-middle class neighborhood, directly to the north, South Kenwood (47th to 51st Streets, Drexel to Lake Michigan), as part of our own neighborhood. But Hyde Park and South Kenwood don't come close to having 99,999 adults. A small portion of my neighbors might also consider a poorer neighborhood to the south, Woodlawn (60th to 67th, Cottage Grove to Lake Michigan), as part of our own neighborhood, but even this boundary does not embrace the 99,999 adults that Aristotle thought even ancient polis dwellers could handle. We think the ancients drew tight boundaries around small communities made up entirely of "their own kind of people." In fact, we may draw even tighter boundaries around ourselves. We are at least less likely to interact meaningfully with strangers than were the ancient Athenians.

The extended boundaries of our own polis of 99,999 adults would include not only Hyde Park, South Kenwood, and Woodlawn, but also several neighborhoods poorer still: directly to the west and across a very large and frequently empty park, the very poor Washington Park and Englewood neighborhoods; to the north and west, North Kenwood and the southern half of Bronzeville and the bottom third of the Robert Taylor Homes housing project; and then, to the south, the northern sections of the Park Manor neighborhood (which one must cross an interstate to reach), and the northern half of the Grand Crossing neighborhood (which one must cross another boundary, the Oakwoods Cemetery, to reach). Here, then, is my polis. How do I act as a political friend within it?

First, I must develop contexts in which to interact with the other members of my polis, for these do not exist. Just by drawing a map of it, I have realized that what my neighbors and I typically recognize as our own neighborhood is in fact separated from the other parts of our polis by freeways, major traffic arteries, train tracks, one large cemetery, and empty parks. Soon I learn, too, with a little historical research, that these boundaries were carefully considered by an earlier

mayor, Richard J. Daley, to keep Chicago neighborhoods racially segregated.¹⁰ My own university helped construct these boundaries.¹¹ A commitment to political friendship, even in respect only to the 99,999 other adults living in my immediate vicinity, requires that I cross geographical, racial, economic boundaries, and challenge the habits of action and mind that my political order and its major institutions have cultivated for nearly half a century; these habits have been fostered since exactly the point when the major institutions of my polis first had a significant opportunity to invent new, integrationist forms of citizenship. There have been glimmerings of a new citizenship. St. Claire Drake and Horace Cayton's *Black Metropolis* (1945) is one of the products of Hyde Park scholars who have faced the challenge I am describing, and the University of Chicago, too, has itself sometimes pointed to an alternative path, for instance, insofar as it has trained some of the twentieth century's most important African American sociologists.

But simply traveling around my polis, learning more about it, talking to the strangers in it, and learning the manifold lessons they have to teach are not enough. In their daily activities, citizens can interact with strangers according to the norms of political friendship and begin to develop reservoirs of trust to sustain political reciprocity, but this nascent interpersonal trust will never mature into full-blown political friendship unless it is given serious political work to do. The military has been the best place for generating interracial trust in the United States precisely because it so often requires people who don't trust each other to take responsibility for one another's lives.¹² In the civilian world, citizens have gotten fairly good at collaborating in musical and athletic exchanges, but when it comes time to share institutional power across racial lines our cooperative skills frequently break down. Yet the techniques of political friendship generate the richest trust when they are exercised in contexts of mutual vulnerability. Citizens, too, like soldiers, must take risks together in shared decision making with real consequences, if they wish to solidify a politics based on political friendship. If the powerful institutions of the polis have carved up the territory so that different groups within the region have their own domains and are rarely involved in power-sharing activities with others, there is little hope for developing extensive trust in the region. At this point, the citizen who desires to

extend the reach of political friendship would do well to catalog the powerful institutions within his polis. There will be churches, schools, businesses, and political networks that offer opportunities and resources to reweave the relationships among citizens by establishing contexts for shared decision making. He should advocate the invention of a power-sharing body to his own institution and try to identify those issues—whether social, economic, or political—that affect the quality of life for everyone in the polis, proposing these as especially important areas of discussion for any power-sharing body.

Again, let me take myself as an example. The one institution with which I work daily is the University of Chicago. Can one speak of a relationship that binds a university to those who live around it? What is its relationship to the other institutions in the polis? As it happens, the institutions of my polis have divided up the territory, each cleaving to its own domain. In my own desire to live according to norms of political friendship and to cultivate trust among citizens within and beyond my polis, I want to reorient my own institution's habits for interacting with strangers. I might propose some boundary-crossing policies to my university as part of an argument that it has a remarkable opportunity to help develop modes of citizenship suitable to their new post-1957 Constitution. As do we all.

In fact, I will propose policies of political friendship, addressing a challenge to the university community in general but particularly to its central faculty governing body, the university senate, in which the president and provost of the university are members *ex officio*. Call this challenge a first sketch for a utopia; it describes ideals in terms of concrete realities. It is by no means a comprehensive set of policy proposals, but rather exemplifies (I hope) the imaginative habits of political friendship. Here goes.

To Members of the Faculty Senate:

This country was reconstituted between *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) and the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts (1964–65). Nearly fifty years have gone by and we haven't yet managed to develop for this new era modes of citizenship to supplant domination and acquiescence. At this juncture, our habits of citizenship need reconstitution more than our laws. Each of us confronts a choice be-

tween fostering new modes of citizenship and, by doing roughly nothing, allowing old forms of citizenship to persist. What is the next phase?

The events of 1957 and of the whole civil rights movement revealed, to those who cared to look, that citizens of the United States have deeply ingrained bad habits: we evade straightforward consideration of when and where public policy asks some citizens to sacrifice for others; we have little interest in cultivating habits for generating trust; we idealize unanimity rather than aspiring to maximize agreement while also dealing frankly with disappointment, anger, and resentment. Our most deeply ingrained lesson in citizenship is "Don't talk to strangers." We, the faculty, have opportunities to embody political friendship instead by converting the university into a visible, public model of that citizenship.

This country's postapartheid reconstitution did not occur elsewhere, distant from the university. Nor is any place in this country innocent of these changes. The University of Chicago did its part to affect the course of integration by inventing, in response to the changing racial makeup of its neighborhood, a program of "urban renewal" that was intended by city, state, and federal governments to serve as a model throughout the country.¹³ What exactly happened? What role has the university assumed for the still ongoing period of integration?

In 1940 fewer than 4 percent of the residents of the university's immediate neighborhood, Hyde Park-Kenwood, were African American. In 1950 African Americans were 6 percent of the population; in 1956 that figure was 36 percent (*PUR* 21). Despite myths to the contrary, the socioeconomic structure of the neighborhood did not change dramatically; roughly 20,000 lower-income whites left and were replaced by roughly 23,000 lower-income African Americans (*PUR* 27-38). Despite myths to the contrary, the increase of African American residents in Hyde Park-Kenwood was not accompanied by rising crime rates. The neighborhood had indeed experienced a perceived increase in crime rates (actual data is difficult to come by) prior to the community's changes in the racial makeup, and residents had thought of their neighborhood as having become a "victim area" that had since the 1930s attracted criminals from other parts of the city (*PUR* 30-31). A handful of fairly dramatic crimes in the early

1950s led the university to establish in 1952, with community consent, the South East Chicago Commission (SECC), which was charged to "organize the total community in order to stabilize it and prevent further flight from the area. Its more specific program [was] to fight crime . . . and begin a long-term project of neighborhood planning and improvement" (*NPLC* 7-8). As a result, from 1952 to 1957, the years of the greatest demographic changes, crime rates dropped steadily in Hyde Park-Kenwood. And, finally, despite still other myths to the contrary, the demographic changes did not cause a mass exodus of university faculty from the neighborhood—with the exception of minor outmigrations by members of the medical school and the administration (*PUR* 32-36).

Many in the university community believed the myths, however, and the look of the community did change dramatically during these years, because of the presence of people of color with different habits and tastes, and also because of profiteering landlords, who took advantage of the pressure on the housing market caused by the migration of African Americans into the city. (After years of neglect during World War II, many buildings were converted into overcrowded rooming houses without adequate facilities and maintenance.) Even a University of Chicago sociologist, writing a history of urban renewal in 1961 from a perspective guardedly in favor of "interracialism," used the language of pest control to describe the situation, implicitly revealing the effect the changes had on him: "The community's southern border zone, the Midway, surrounded by university-owned land, did not lend itself to use as an invasion route" (*PUR* 20); "The invasion did not by 1956 make serious inroads on the population elements that set the tone for Hyde Park" (*PUR* 33).

From 1952 to 1954 members of the SECC worked to develop a plan for urban renewal that would preserve the community "from the infiltration of blight from the broken and disintegrated sections of the old inner city adjacent to it" (SECC 2) and, in March 1954, two months before *Brown v. Board of Education*, the mayor of Chicago, Martin Kennelly, "formally announced the inauguration of the first real demonstration of a program intended to reverse the trends toward deterioration which characterized older communities in most U.S. cities" (SECC 1). Only in 1961 would a university official finally acknowledge that the subtext had always been integration, and the

country's reconstitution. "Until we Americans have learned to rebuild and prevent slums, restore beauty to our cities, and provide education and social opportunities to people who have not had them—largely because of the color of their skins—we will not have justified the faith of those who laid the foundations of our nation. . . . We must keep up the effort, for if we succeed we will have established a pattern for the rest of the nation to follow." So wrote George Beadle for his inauguration to the chancellorship of the university in May 1961, a month before he would also become president of the SECC, the body that was primarily responsible for conceiving and bringing to maturation the project of urban renewal. What, then, was the pattern that the university and the SECC, together with city, state, and federal governments, established for integration?

The creation of the SECC initiated the division of the city of Chicago into a multitude of neighborhood development corporations, each taking as its mission the protection of its own neighborhood, quite frequently from the communities neighboring it.¹⁴ Well before other neighborhood development corporations sprang up, on the model of the SECC, the leaders of that organization had already achieved state and federal legislative victories that made development corporations a remarkably powerful instrument for controlling a community (*NPUC* 14-15, *PUR* 84-88). New laws and amendments to old ones that were advocated by the SECC resulted in the following situation:

Any three citizens and residents of a neighborhood could organize a private corporation, with capital of not less than \$1000, to carry out a redevelopment plan. The corporation had to prove that it would be working in an area of at least two acres in which at least 20 percent of residential dwellings were in dilapidated structures. Dilapidation included "obsolescence, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light, or sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use or layout or any combination of these factors" (SECC 48). Once a territory had been designated as a development zone, the private development corporation, if it could acquire 60 percent of the property in that area or the consent of 60 percent of the property owners to its development plans, acquired right of eminent domain over the other 40 percent of the property in that zone. The private development corporation could exercise that right of eminent do-

main to acquire and destroy buildings and resell property even to private developers.¹⁵

Eminent domain powers (which we typically think of as enshrined in the Constitution) to allow federal and state governments to pursue projects for the public good are, in Illinois, available in an especially vigorous form to private parties even to this day.¹⁶ They were strengthened to this degree to help Northern cities cope with the effects of looming civil strife in the South and the rising prospect of integration. The Federal Housing Act, yet another important political decision of 1954, made substantial subsidies available to neighborhood development corporations for the exercise of those eminent domain and redevelopment powers. The SECC began by seeking \$3,149,379 of federal funds and \$1,574,690 of city and university funds for the first phase of the renewal program (SECC 124). By 1956, the federal government had approved \$25,835,000 of federal funds for the project (*NPUC* 20), demolition had begun, and the neighborhood looked "like Berlin immediately after the late war," to quote the university's chancellor (*NPUC* 23). By 1957 the university had spent \$5,325,000 of its own funds (*NPUC* 25), and the initial phase of operations had moved 4,519 people from a 48-acre area (SECC 95; *NPUC* 15). By 1958, a complete urban renewal plan was finally approved at federal, state, and local levels, after "bitter controversy." The plan covered 591.4 acres, of which 101.2 were to be cleared, which entailed demolition of 5,941 living units in the area. By this point, federal monies granted to the project had risen to \$28,312,062. Throughout, the SECC steered decisions about which buildings to condemn and how to rebuild.

The other arm of the SECC's activity was law enforcement. In 1952 the commission decided that its "interest in law enforcement would not involve vigilante activities or the employment of private investigators. Attention would, rather, be directed to detailed, ongoing statistical analysis of police performance in the area, with particular attention as to the adequacy of the manpower assigned, offenses occurring, arrests made, and the percentage of crimes solved" (*NPUC* 8). Yet by 1955 the SECC had hired two full-time private policemen (*PUR* 82), and in the 1960s the university established its own police force to patrol the Hyde Park-Kenwood neighborhood with powers equal to those of the city police. A citizenship of distrust requires dis-

mal expenditures, and the annual budget for the force now reaches into the millions.

In the 1950s and 1960s the university thus established a pattern for dealing with integration that had force at its core. The university community, not well integrated in the 1950s, was willing to accept integration in its neighborhood provided that it had nearly total control over the terms, establishing how traffic patterns would flow, what sort of businesses would be permitted and where, which parts of the neighborhood would be available for lower-income residents, and how to arrange the look and functions of public spaces. A "biracial" middle- and upper-class community that has achieved low crime rates and that successfully avoided "becom[ing] all-Negro, like surrounding areas," by relocating lower-class whites and African Americans out of the neighborhood has resulted from these efforts (*PUR* 45-46); so too has a culture of distrust now several decades old. Members of the university community were willing to share space with strangers (or at least a certain minority percentage of strangers), and were generous to this degree. But they were unable to share power. The university had approached integration without accepting the prospect of the mutual vulnerability of white and black to each other's influence. Friendship cannot flourish on such ground. It is no surprise that the university has enduring problems recruiting African American students from Chicago, or that the neighborhood remains biracial more than integrated.

Lately, however, the university has begun to move in a new direction, at last seeking to create trust and to dissolve old boundaries: by starting charter schools in immediately surrounding neighborhoods; by designating full scholarships to the university for students from the Chicago Public School system; by placing its students in local schools as teachers' aides and tutors; by supporting the participation of faculty in programs providing accredited college-level courses to adults at or near the poverty line; by establishing and quickly expanding a University Community Service Center; by working to generate economic and employment opportunities on the South Side of Chicago; and by providing subsidies to staff and faculty who buy housing in areas beyond the traditional limits of the university's neighborhood.

Most important, the university has recently expanded its police coverage to neighborhoods beyond the university's traditional bound-

aries with the consent of and, in some instances, at the request of neighbors. Whereas the university campus extends north to south from 5th to 60th Streets and east to west for five blocks, its police now travel as far north as 39th Street and as far south as 63rd Street, at an annual cost of several million dollars. Community residents at public meetings are reported to have expressed satisfaction that the university at last sees them too as worthy of the same protection that upper-class members of the university community receive. And as best as I can tell, the university community, including the administration, imagines that the university will keep an extensive police force in perpetuity. The university in its public aspect has become a rough equivalent to a private security company, something like the Bel Air patrol, which posts signs on the lawns of houses it guards, promising an "armed response." Over the long term this mode of self-presentation will undermine other efforts of trust generation that rest more on collaboration than on power.

In my utopia universities would have no police. For all the good that the university's force has done to establish conditions where diverse citizens can begin to interact once again on the streets and in public spaces, we should not be content to let the project of integration depend on the display and application of force. A university seeks to advance the reach of knowledge through open intellectual inquiry and exchange, but presently this university presents itself to its neighbors armed and in uniform rather than carrying books and ideas. If the university's police force does its work well, it should help generate trust that might of itself diminish the need for policing; but if the members of our polis fail to imagine and plan for a future where the university's police will be unnecessary, we may miss the tipping point where the police cease to be a cause of trust and become rather a source of its corrosion. Now is the time to seek other methods for generating trust. Above all else, we need methods of integration based on political friendship rather than force.

How can the university make its defining features of openness and free exchange in conditions of equality the basis for its interactions with other citizens in its polis? How can these sources of strength and power generate trust? In order to expand its police coverage to 39th Street, the university has just assumed an additional annual expenditure of roughly \$300,000. What if these funds were used for other acts

of generosity more in keeping with the university's central mission, perhaps to support open access to the library and athletic facilities for polis residents? Educational and informational resources are distributed very unevenly within this area; in this information age, the university might aspire to invent new methods for achieving the unencumbered circulation of information and knowledge across socioeconomic and ethnic divides. The university could establish satellite sites within the community where intellectual resources would be made broadly available: for instance, courses in the humanities (through which, in this country, the majority of powerful citizens have always acquired the cultural literacy that has been the basis of their power) and clinics on entrepreneurship, legal questions, and medical issues. Or it might support the establishment of Kinko's-type office service centers throughout the polis, attaching such clinics to them. Public cultural events held at the university should be advertised in all the community newspapers of the polis as a matter of course. Or what if some of these funds were diverted to research on the problems of contemporary policing? The university police fill the same gap in Hyde Park as do private security companies in wealthy neighborhoods, but to fill a gap is to obscure a problem: too often publicly funded police are trusted neither by the wealthy, nor by the poor, and scarcely by anyone in between. The university might seek to develop policy that might eventually return the United States to a situation where city and state police are adequate to the job of establishing a sense of security for every resident—poor, rich, and middling.

But to share resources in mutually beneficial ways is only half of the business of political friendship. It is crucial to remember that even generous citizens will be distrusted if they refuse to share power. The university's new policies, especially the expansion of the university's police force, will have serious public consequences for the polis, but few of them have been discussed publicly even within the university. Our own new policies treat trust-building as central to the reversal of the boundaries exploited in the 1950s and 1960s, and implicitly aim to reconstitute strangers' habits of interaction within the polis. But such reconstitution can't occur in private by quiet administrative decisions, praiseworthy though they may be. The development of new norms for the interaction of strangers within the polis requires public discussion *among* strangers. Trust grows only through experience; habits of

citizenship are fashioned only through actual interaction. Although I am reluctant to propose new committees, the effects of institutions on our patterns of interaction cannot be ignored, and sometimes the fastest route to redirecting interaction is indeed to restructure an institution. Since 1952 roughly fifteen neighborhood development corporations have sprung up in the territory of our polis. Like the original South East Chicago Commission, these neighborhood development corporations tend to take protectionist stances against other neighborhoods; collaboration across the whole area of the polis has been minimal; citizen conversations about development issues and concerns tend not to flow across neighborhood boundaries. I think it's time for a polis-wide development council, perhaps composed of the presidents of each neighborhood development corporation.¹⁷

Such a council could give a public airing to development plans and policy decisions that are likely to affect the polis in general. It could also propose goals for the community as a whole, carry out impact studies of projects envisioned by the university or other large institutional bodies within the polis, and cultivate a community-wide discussion on how powerful institutions within the community, and in particular the university, can reach their own goals while also respecting and responding to the goals and concerns of the community. The council might begin its work with efforts to repeal and/or amend the eminent domain laws that give private corporations excessive power over the property of their fellow citizens. These laws exemplify the sort of policy proposals that distribute power so unevenly as to make trust impossible. Although the university no longer uses these laws, their public repudiation would be a powerful symbolic gesture. During the first fifty years of this country's experiment with integration, we failed to find ways of slipping loose of habits of domination and acquiescence. This should be our main goal for the next fifty years. With a decision to set aside overly strong versions of eminent domain powers in favor of collaborative approaches to solving problems of community development, we would at last set our faces in the right direction.

Would efforts exerted toward these proposals divert the university from its central mission to educate students and advance knowledge? Would they entail an improper use of the funds of a private educational institution? Hardly. A sizeable proportion of the university's faculty

purport to explain our world to us, and often also to propose methods for dealing with that world. The university's ability to analyze, explain, and respond, in intellectually coherent terms, to its own difficulties is an important test of its success at the very business at which it claims expertise. Any discoveries it might make about what, in an urban context, can convert distrust to trust, generate economic opportunity, and extend the impact of educational resources will count as valuable research around the world. Finally, any university that operates in a democratic context must admit that it educates citizens; it ought at least to know what sort of political education it provides. Most students and faculty on campus wonder exactly why relations to the community feel so poisonous. Very few know about Illinois' remarkable eminent domain laws, nor of the university's role in writing and then implementing them. How uncommonly embarrassing that at a university we accept such a high degree of ignorance about our own circumstances. We should now have the self-confidence to make the university vulnerable within the community, trusting that over the long term appropriate vulnerability will issue in vastly greater rewards, both of self-knowledge and of political friendship, than do current norms of distrust.

Even if one were to dismiss my reasons for the university to attend to its role as a political friend within its community, there remains an important economic factor. If the university were able to generate, within its polls, habits for the interaction of strangers that significantly diminished the need for police protection, it might at some future point divert the bulk of those funds to fellowships for students, books for the library, laboratory equipment, or faculty positions. It would win its own "peace" dividend.

My eye is on the moment when the University of Chicago would have no police. A commitment to political friendship opens up the possibility of pursuing a real world version of that ideal. Not only a healthier, more democratic community, but also a stronger university lie along this road.

Yours sincerely,
Danielle Allen

The ancient Greeks believed in treating strangers hospitably in case any of them should turn out to be a god. I have been advocating treat-

ing strangers well on the grounds that we are related to one another in more ways than we know, even if race and class have made it difficult for us to see those connections. During my final days of writing this manuscript, my husband, Bob, had a remarkable experience that converts the Greek proverb into modern form. We were spending our summer vacation in Los Angeles where we both grew up. One evening I had gone to visit a cousin and so did not join my husband and stepson for our usual dinner at a Mexican grill. The two of them chose their table, my stepson went to the washroom, and a bag lady stepped up to the table to ask if she could use the empty spot. Not much looking at her, my husband said yes. Police love this restaurant, and soon she was talking across the aisle to them, complaining about treatment she'd received during the day. Something about her voice struck Bob's attention. By the time Isaac got back from the bathroom, Bob was sure he knew something important about the woman. Isaac sat down and Bob said to her, "I have a surprise for you." She looked at him, confused. "For me?" "Yes, I have a surprise for you. Isaac, tell the lady your name." Isaac answered just with his first name, and Bob asked him again, "No, tell the lady your whole name." "Isaac von Hallberg." "That's *my* name!" she exclaimed. Still, she did not figure out what Bob had already realized. Finally, he had to tell her his whole name, Robert von Hallberg, and say, "And you're Marie von Hallberg, my cousin." He had recognized her voice.

"Unless we continually explore the network of complex relationships which bind us together," to quote Ellison a final time, "we [will] continue being the victims of various inadequate conceptions of ourselves, both as individuals and as citizens of a nation of diverse people." The adoption of the aspirations and techniques of political friendship by any of us, even individually, would have ramifying effects. And, happily, liberal institutions make it possible for us to interact with fellow citizens well beyond the limit of the "polls" with its 99,999 inhabitants. That number provided us with a thought experiment; liberalism allows us to extend political friendship beyond local and to national contexts. Wherever we move throughout our polity, we have opportunities to engage strangers in political friendship because strong institutional protections of rights free us to take risks on interactions that we could not otherwise afford. Nor, when we are active as political friends in our own polls, can we forget about

the rest of the people with whom we share our polity. The final test of whether we have managed to cultivate political friendship in our own communities is not how we treat the 99,998 other residents immediately around us, but whether a stranger to our neighborhood, any stranger also willing to act like a political friend, including strangers from beyond the nation's borders, could land there and flourish in conjunction with us.¹⁸ My utopia stands as a proposal to democratic citizens generally to develop their capacities for political imagination, particularly with reference to the strangers in their lives. The long-term ability of this democracy to convert distrust to trust is the reward.

Am I right about the potential of political friendship to rejuvenate democratic practice? Aristotle closes his treatise on rhetoric with words that he presents as the best way to close an argument, and which I will accordingly use: "You've heard me, you understand. Now judge."

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