

**WHY CIVIL RESISTANCE WORKS THE STRATEGIC  
LOGIC OF NONVIOLENT CONFLICT**

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**AND REMANENCE. THE ISRAELI SECRET SERVICES AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM**

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*Nonviolence is fine as long as it works.*

MALCOLM X

IN NOVEMBER 1975, Indonesian president Suharto

ordered a full-scale invasion of East Timor, claiming that the left-leaning nationalist group that had declared independence for East Timor a month earlier, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), was a communist threat to the region. Fretilin's armed wing, the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil), led the early resistance to Indonesian occupation forces in the form of conventional and guerrilla warfare. Using weapons left behind by Portuguese troops, Falintil forces waged armed struggle from East Timor's mountainous jungle region. But Falintil would not win the day. Despite some early successes, by 1980 Indonesia's brutal counterinsurgency campaign had decimated the armed resistance along with nearly one third of the East Timorese population.<sup>2</sup>

Yet nearly two decades later, a nonviolent resistance movement helped to successfully remove Indonesian troops from East Timor and win independence for the annexed territory. The Clandestine Front, an organization originally envisaged as a support network for the armed movement, eventually reversed roles and became the driving force behind the nonviolent, pro-independence resistance. Beginning in 1988, the Clandestine Front, which grew out of an East Timorese youth movement, developed a large decentralized network of activists, who planned and executed various nonviolent campaigns inside East Timor, in Indonesia, and internationally. These included protests timed to the visits of diplomats and dignitaries, sit-ins inside foreign embassies, and international solidarity efforts that reinforced Timorese-led nonviolent activism.

The Indonesian regime repressed this movement, following its standard approach to violent and nonviolent challengers from within. But this repression backfired. Following the deaths of more than two hundred East Timorese nonviolent protesters at the hands of Indonesian troops in Dili in November 1991, the pro-independence campaign experienced a ma-

for turning point. The massacre, which was captured on film by a British cameraman, was quickly broadcast around the world, causing international outrage and prompting the East Timorese to rethink their strategy (Kohen 1999; Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001). Intensifying nonviolent protests and moving the resistance into Indonesia proper became major components of the new strategy.

Suharto was ousted in 1998 after an economic crisis and mass popular uprising, and Indonesia's new leader, B. J. Habibie, quickly pushed through a series of political and economic reforms designed to restore stability and international credibility to the country. There was tremendous international pressure on Habibie to resolve the East Timor issue, which had become a diplomatic embarrassment, not to mention a huge drain on Indonesia's budget. During a 1999 referendum, almost 80 percent of East Timorese voters opted for independence. Following the referendum, Indonesian-backed militias launched a scorched-earth campaign that led to mass destruction and displacement. On September 14, 2000, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to authorize an Australian-led international force for East Timor.<sup>3</sup>

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor oversaw a two-year transition period before East Timor became the world's newest independent state in May 2002 (Martin 2000). Although a small number of Falintil guerrillas (whose targets had been strictly military) kept their weapons until the very end, it was not their violent resistance that liberated the territory from Indonesian occupation. As one Clandestine Front member explained, "The Falintil was an important symbol of resistance and their presence in the mountains helped boost morale, but nonviolent struggle ultimately allowed us to achieve victory. The whole population fought for independence, even Indonesians, and this was decisive."<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, in the Philippines in the late 1970s, several revolutionary guerrilla groups were steadily gaining strength. The Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People's Army (NPA) were inspired by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideologies and pursued armed revolution to gain power. State-sponsored military attacks on the NPA dispersed the guerrilla resistance until the NPA encompassed all regions of the country. The Philippine government launched a concerted counterinsurgency effort, and the NPA was never able to achieve power.

In the early 1980s, however, members of the opposition began to pursue a different strategy. In 1985 the reformist opposition united under the banner of UNIDO (United Nationalist Democratic Organization) with Cory Aquino as its presidential candidate. In the period leading up to the elections, Aquino urged nonviolent discipline, making clear that violent attacks against opponents would not be tolerated. Church leaders, similarly, insisted on discipline, while the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections trained half a million volunteers to monitor elections.

When Marcos declared himself the winner of the 1986 elections despite the counterclaims of election monitors, Cory Aquino led a rally of 2 million Filipinos, proclaiming victory for herself and "the people." The day after Marcos's inauguration, Filipinos participated in a general strike, a boycott of the state media, a massive run on state-controlled banks, a boycott of crony businesses, and other nonviolent activities.

A dissident faction of the military signaled that it favored the opposition in this matter, encouraging the opposition to form a parallel government on February 25 with Aquino at its head. Masses of unarmed Filipino civilians, including nuns and priests, surrounded the barracks where the rebel soldiers were holed up, forming a buffer between those soldiers and those who remained loyal to Marcos. President Ronald Reagan's administration had grown weary of Marcos and signaled support for the opposition movement. That evening, U.S. military helicopters transported Marcos and his family to Hawaii, where they remained in exile. Although the Philippines has experienced a difficult transition to democracy, the nonviolent campaign successfully removed the Marcos dictatorship. Where violent insurgency had failed only a few years earlier, the People Power movement succeeded.

## THE PUZZLE

The preceding narratives reflect both specific and general empirical puzzles. Specifically, we ask why nonviolent resistance has succeeded in some cases where violent resistance had failed in the same states, like the violent and nonviolent pro-independence campaigns in East Timor and regime-change campaigns in the Philippines. We can further ask why nonviolent resistance in some states fails during one period (such as the 1950s Defiance Campaign by antiapartheid activists in South Africa) and then succeeds decades later (such as the antiapartheid struggle in the early 1990s).

These two specific questions underline a more general inquiry, which is the focus of this book. We seek to explain two related phenomena: why nonviolent resistance often succeeds relative to violent resistance, and under what conditions, nonviolent resistance succeeds or fails.<sup>5</sup>

Indeed, debates about the strategic logic of different methods of traditional and nontraditional warfare have recently become popular among security studies scholars (Abrahms 2006; Arreguin-Toft 2005; Byman and Waxman 1999, 2000; Dashi-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Drury 1998; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Lyall and Wilson 2009; Microm 2003; Pape 1996, 1997, 2005; Stoker 2007). Implicit in many of these assessments, however, is an assumption that the most forceful, effective means of waging political struggle entails the threat or use of violence. For instance, a prevailing view among political scientists is that opposition movements select terrorism and violent insurgency strategies because such means are more effective than nonviolent strategies at achieving policy goals (Abrahms 2006, 77; Pape 2009). Often violence is viewed as a last resort, or a necessary evil in light of desperate circumstances. Other scholarship focuses on the effectiveness of military power, without comparing it with alternative forms of power (Brooks 2003; Brooks and Stanley 2007; Desch 2008; Johnson and Tierney 2006).

Despite these assumptions, in recent years organized civilian populations have successfully used nonviolent resistance methods, including boycotts, strikes, protests, and organized noncooperation to exact political concessions and challenge entrenched power. To name a few, sustained and systematic nonviolent sanctions have removed autocratic regimes from power in Serbia (2000), Madagascar (2002), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004–2005), after rigged elections; ended a foreign occupation in Lebanon (2005); and forced Nepal's monarch to make major constitutional concessions (2006). In the first two months of 2011, popular nonviolent uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt removed decades-old regimes from power. As this book goes to press, the prospect of people power transforming the Middle East remains strong.

In our Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set, we analyze 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006.<sup>6</sup> Among them are over one hundred major nonviolent campaigns since 1900, whose frequency has increased over time. In addition to their growing frequency, the success rates of nonviolent campaigns have increased. How does this compare with violent insurgencies? One might as-


sume that the success rates may have increased among both nonviolent and violent insurgencies. But in our data, we find the opposite: although they persist, the success rates of violent insurgencies have declined.

The most striking finding is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts. As we discuss in chapter 3, the effects of resistance type on the probability of campaign success are robust even when we take into account potential confounding factors, such as target regime type, repression, and target regime capabilities.<sup>7</sup>


The results begin to differ only when we consider the objectives of the resistance campaigns themselves. Among the 323 campaigns, in the case of antiregime resistance campaigns, the use of a nonviolent strategy has greatly enhanced the likelihood of success. Among campaigns with territorial objectives, like antioccupation or self-determination, nonviolent campaigns also have a slight advantage. Among the few cases of major resistance that do not fall into either category (antiapartheid campaigns, for instance), nonviolent resistance has had the monopoly on success.

The only exception is that nonviolent resistance leads to successful secession less often than violent insurgency. Although no nonviolent secession campaigns have succeeded, only four of the forty-one violent secession campaigns have done so (less than 10 percent), also an unimpressive figure. The implication is that campaigns seeking secession are highly unlikely to


FIGURE 11 FREQUENCY OF NONVIOLENT AND VIOLENT CAMPAIGN END YEARS




**FIGURE 12 NUMBER OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS AND PERCENTAGE OF SUCCESSES, 1940-2006**




**FIGURE 14 RATES OF SUCCESS, PARTIAL SUCCESS, AND FAILURE**



**FIGURE 13 SUCCESS RATES BY DECADE, 1940-2006**



**FIGURE 15 SUCCESS RATES BY CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVE**



succeed regardless of whether they employ nonviolent or violent tactics. We explore various factors that could influence these results in chapter 3. It is evident, however, that especially among campaigns seeking regime change or liberation from foreign occupation, nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior. The success of these nonviolent campaigns—especially in light of the enduring violent insurgencies occurring in many of the same countries—begs systematic exploration.

This book investigates the reasons why—in spite of conventional wisdom to the contrary—civil resistance campaigns have been so effective compared with their violent counterparts. We also consider the reasons why some nonviolent campaigns have failed to achieve their stated aims, and the reasons why violent insurgencies sometimes succeed.

## THE ARGUMENT

Our central contention is that nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is an important factor in determining campaign outcomes. The moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower for nonviolent resistance than for violent insurgency. Higher levels of participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success, including enhanced resilience, higher probabilities of tactical innovation, expanded civic disruption (thereby raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo), and loyalty shifts involving the opponent's erstwhile supporters, including members of the security forces. Mobilization among local supporters is a more reliable source of power than the support of external allies, which many violent campaigns must obtain to compensate for their lack of participants.

Moreover, we find that the transitions that occur in the wake of successful nonviolent resistance movements create much more durable and internally peaceful democracies than transitions provoked by violent insurgencies. On the whole, nonviolent resistance campaigns are more effective in getting results and, once they have succeeded, more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse into civil war.

Nestling our argument between literatures on asymmetrical warfare, contentious politics, and strategic nonviolent action, we explain the relative effectiveness of nonviolent resistance in the following way: nonviolent campaigns facilitate the active participation of many more people than violent campaigns, thereby broadening the base of resistance and raising the costs

to opponents of maintaining the status quo. The mass civilian participation in a nonviolent campaign is more likely to backfire in the face of repression, encourage loyalty shifts among regime supporters, and provide resistance leaders with a more diverse menu of tactical and strategic choices. To regime elites, those engaged in civil resistance are more likely to appear as credible negotiating partners than are violent insurgents, thereby increasing the chance of winning concessions.

However, we also know that resistance campaigns are not guaranteed to succeed simply because they are nonviolent. One in four nonviolent campaigns since 1900 was a total failure. In short, we argue that nonviolent campaigns fail to achieve their objectives when they are unable to overcome the challenge of participation, when they fail to recruit a robust, diverse, and broad-based membership that can erode the power base of the adversary and maintain resilience in the face of repression.

Moreover, more than one in four violent campaigns has succeeded. We briefly investigate the question of why violent campaigns sometimes succeed. Whereas the success of nonviolent campaigns tends to rely more heavily on local factors, violent insurgencies tend to succeed when they achieve external support or when they feature a central characteristic of successful nonviolent campaigns, which is mass popular support. The presence of an external sponsor combined with a weak or predatory regime adversary may enhance the credibility of violent insurgencies, which may threaten the opponent regime. The credibility gained through external support may also increase the appeal to potential recruits, thereby allowing insurgencies to mobilize more participants against the opponent. Internal support is, however, a double-edged sword. Foreign-state sponsors can be fickle and unreliable allies, and state sponsorship can produce a lack of discipline among insurgents and exacerbate free rider problems (Bob 2005; Byrman 2005).

## THE EVIDENCE

We bring to bear several different types of evidence to support our argument, including statistical evidence from the NAVCO data set and qualitative evidence from four case studies: Iran, the Palestinian Territories, Burma, and the Philippines.

It is appropriate here to briefly define the terms to which we will consistently refer in this book. First, we should distinguish violent and non-

violent tactics. As noted earlier, there are some difficulties with labeling one campaign as violent and another as nonviolent. In many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously among competing groups. Often those who employ violence in mass movements are members of fringe groups who are acting independently, or in defiance of, the central leadership; or they are agents provocateurs used by the adversary to provoke the unarmed resistance to adopt violence (Zunes 1994). Alternatively, often some groups use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the ANC in South Africa. Characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a complex constellation of resistance methods.

It is nevertheless possible to characterize a campaign as principally nonviolent based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods and the nature of the participation in that form of resistance. Sharp defines nonviolent resistance as "a technique of socio-political action for applying power in a conflict without the use of violence" (1999, 567). The term *resistance* implies that the campaigns of interest are noninstitutional and generally confrontational in nature. In other words, these groups are using tactics that are outside the conventional political process (voting, interest-group organizing, or lobbying). Although institutional methods of political action often accompany nonviolent struggles, writes sociologist Kurt Schock, nonviolent action occurs outside the bounds of institutional political channels (2003, 705).<sup>8</sup>

Our study focuses instead on a type of political activity that deliberately or necessarily circumvents normal political channels and employs noninstitutional (and often illegal) forms of action against an opponent. Civil resistance employs social, psychological, economic, and political methods, including boycotts (social, economic, and political), strikes, protests, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other acts of civil disobedience and noncooperation to mobilize publics to oppose or support different policies, to delegitimize adversaries, and to remove or restrict adversaries' sources of power (Sharp 1973).<sup>9</sup> Nonviolent resistance consists of acts of omission, acts of commission, and a combination of both (Sharp 2005).<sup>10</sup>

We characterize violent resistance as a form of political contention and a method of exerting power that, like nonviolent resistance, operates outside normal political channels. While conventional militaries use violence to advance political goals, in this book we are concerned with the use of unconventional violent strategies used by nonstate actors.<sup>11</sup> These strategies

are exhibited in three main categories of unconventional warfare: revolutions, plots (or coups d'état), and insurgencies, which differ according to the level of premeditated planning, protractedness, and means of overthrowing the existing order.<sup>12</sup> The weapons system available to an armed insurgent is very different from that of its nonviolent analogue. Violent tactics include bombings, shootings, kidnappings, physical sabotage such as the destruction of infrastructure, and other types of physical harm of people and property. However, the cases we examine do not include military coups, since we are primarily interested in substate actors that are not part of the state. Both violent and nonviolent campaigns seek to take power by force, though the method of applying force differs across the different resistance types.

The list of nonviolent campaigns was initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. Then these data were corroborated with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle (2006). Finally, we consulted with experts in the field, who suggested any remaining conflicts of note. The resulting list includes major campaigns that are primarily or entirely nonviolent. Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are not considered nonviolent.

Violent campaign data are derived primarily from Kristian Gleditsch's (2004) updates to the Correlates of War (COW) database on intrastate wars, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson's (2009) database of insurgencies, and Kalev Sepp's (2005) list of major counterinsurgency operations. The COW data set requires all combatant groups to be armed and to have sustained a thousand battle deaths during the course of the conflict, suggesting that the conflict is necessarily violent.

This study makes a further qualification. Nonviolent and violent campaigns are used to promote a number of different policy objectives, ranging from increasing personal liberties to obtaining greater rights or privileges for an ethnic group to demanding national independence. However, this project is concerned primarily with three specific, intense, and extreme forms of resistance: antiregime, antioccupation, and secession campaigns. These campaign types are chosen for several reasons. First, they provide a hard case for civil resistance. Antiregime, antioccupation, and self-determination campaigns are typically associated in the literature with violence, whereas civil rights and other strictly human rights movements are more commonly

associated with nonviolent methods. However, in this study we argue that nonviolent resistance can be used to achieve political objectives most commonly identified with violent insurgencies.

Success and failure are also complex outcomes, about which much has been written (Baldwin 2000). For our study, to be considered a "success" a campaign had to meet two conditions: the full achievement of its stated goals (regime change, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of the peak of activities and a discernible effect on the outcome, such that the outcome was a direct result of the campaign's activities (Pape 1997).<sup>13</sup> The second qualification is important because in some cases the desired outcome occurred mainly because of other conditions. The Greek resistance against the Nazi occupation, for example, is not coded as a full success even though the Nazis ultimately withdrew from Greece. Although effective in many respects, the Greek resistance alone cannot be credited with the ultimate outcome of the end of Nazi influence over Greece since the Nazi withdrawal was the result of the Allied victory rather than solely Greek resistance.

The term *campaign* is also somewhat contentious as a unit of analysis. Following Ackerman and Kruegler (1994, 10–11), we define a campaign as a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts.<sup>14</sup> Usually campaigns have distinguishable beginning and end points, as well as discernible events throughout the campaign. In the case of resistance campaigns, beginning and end points are difficult to determine, as are the events throughout the campaign. In some cases, information on such events is readily available (e.g., Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1999); however, in most cases, it is not. Therefore, our characterization of the beginning and end dates of campaigns is based on consensus data and multiple sources.<sup>15</sup>

Some readers may be tempted to dismiss our findings as the results of selection effects, arguing that the nonviolent campaigns that appear in our inventory are biased toward success, since it is the large, often mature campaigns that are most commonly reported. Other would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed in their infancy (and therefore fail) are not included in this study. This is a potential concern that is difficult to avoid.

We adopted a threefold data-collection strategy to address this concern. First, our selection of campaigns and their beginning and end dates is based

on consensus data produced by multiple sources. Second, we have established rigorous standards of inclusion for each campaign. The nonviolent campaigns were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. Then these data were corroborated with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and the bibliography by Carter, Clark, and Randle (2006).

Finally, we circulated the data set among experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether any notable conflicts had been omitted, and whether we had properly accounted for failed movements. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used. Our confidence in the data set that emerged was reinforced by numerous discussions among scholars of both nonviolent and violent conflicts.

Nonetheless, what remains absent from the data set is a way to measure the nonstarters, the nonviolent or violent campaigns that never emerged because of any number of reasons. Despite this concern, we feel confident proceeding with our inquiry for two main reasons. First, this bias applies as much to violent campaigns as to nonviolent ones—many violent campaigns that were defeated early on are also unreported in the data. Second, this study is not concerned primarily with *why* these campaigns emerge but with *how well* they perform relative to their competitors that use different methods of resistance. We focus on the efficacy of campaigns as opposed to their origins, and we argue that we can say something about the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns *relative to* violent campaigns. We do concede, however, that improved data collection and analysis and finding ways to overcome the selection bias inherent in much scholarship on conflict are vital next steps for the field.

## WHY COMPARE NONVIOLENT AND VIOLENT RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS?

Generally, scholars have eschewed the systematic comparison of the outcomes of violent and nonviolent movements. One notable exception is William Ganson, whose seminal work (1990) on American challenge groups discovered that groups employing force and violence were more successful than groups refraining from violent tactics (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 14). Not only does he seem to conflate force with violence, but also his



conclusions, while perhaps pertinent to certain types of groups within the American political system, do not necessarily apply to all countries during all times.<sup>16</sup>

Hence scholarship on this question rightly investigates whether such generalizations are applicable to other places and periods. In attempting to understand the relationship between nonviolent and violent tactics and the outcomes of resistance campaigns, however, scholars have tended to focus on single case studies or small-n comparisons in what has become a rich accumulation of research and knowledge on the subject (Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Ackerman and Krueger 1994; Boudreau 2004; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973, 2005; Wehr, Burgess, and Burgess 1994; Zunes 1994; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999). What has been missing, though, are catalogs of known campaigns and systematic comparisons of the outcomes of both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns, although this trend has begun to shift (Shaykhutdinov 2010; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).

As one might expect, there are several good reasons why social scientists have avoided comparing the dynamics and outcomes of nonviolent and violent campaigns, including their relative effectiveness. First, the separation of campaigns into violent and nonviolent for analytical purposes is problematic. Few campaigns, historically, have been purely violent or nonviolent, and many resistance movements, particularly protracted ones, have had violent and nonviolent periods. Armed and unarmed elements often operate simultaneously in the same struggle. Still, it is possible to distinguish between different resistance types based on the actors involved (civilians or armed militants) and the methods used (nonviolent or violent).<sup>17</sup> Scholars have identified the unique characteristics of these different forms of struggle, and we feel comfortable characterizing some resistance campaigns as primarily violent and others as primarily nonviolent. We are furthermore careful to avoid characterizing a campaign as violent merely because the regime uses violence in an attempt to suppress the protest activity.

Second, security studies scholars seem to have eschewed the study of nonviolent action because nonviolent action is not typically viewed as a form of insurgency or asymmetrical warfare (Schock 2003). Groups deliberately adopting nonviolent tactics are commonly understood as doing so for moral or principled reasons (Howes 2009). Since some key authors promoting strategic nonviolent action have also been pacifists, this characterization

has not been wholly unfounded. Nonetheless, among some security studies scholars, the idea that resistance leaders might choose nonviolent tactics as a strategic choice may be considered naive or implausible. Although the topic of civilian-based defense, a type of unconventional defense involving civilian populations defending their nations from military invasions and occupations using organized noncooperation and civil disobedience, received the attention of security and strategic studies (including the RAND Corporation) during the Cold War, interest in the subject from the security studies community has waned since the fall of the iron curtain (Sharp 1990).<sup>18</sup> Hence the serious study of strategic nonviolent action has remained something of a pariah within security studies despite decades of scholarship on the subject.

Finally, the questions of interest in this book—whether nonviolent resistance methods are more effective than violent resistance methods and under which conditions civil resistance succeeds or fails—are by nature extremely difficult to study. It is not by accident that few authors have been able to compile large-n data sets on the subject despite important efforts to do so.<sup>19</sup> The measurement of effectiveness itself is difficult to gather and defend, and the independent effects of resistance methods on the outcomes are not always easy to discern given the complexity of these contentious episodes.

Despite the challenges associated with studying this subject, we argue that the theoretical and policy implications of the research questions at hand are too important to avoid. Sidney Tarrow has argued that investigating the reasons why movements succeed and fail is one of the main foci of the entire contentious politics research program (1998). Our book demonstrates that scholars can take a reasoned look at the relative effectiveness of nonviolent and violent resistance, even if the measures of such terms are imperfect. We undertake such an exploration by examining 323 cases from 1900 to 2006 of major nonviolent and violent campaigns seeking regime change, the expulsion of foreign occupiers, or secession. This research is the first to catalog, compare, and analyze all known cases of major armed and unarmed insurrections during this period. From this data, we find support for the perspective that nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior to violent resistance during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Because the data are highly aggregated, we provide only a first look at these trends. But our findings point to a powerful relationship that scholars and policy makers should take seriously.

## SCHOLARLY IMPLICATIONS

This research is situated among several distinct albeit related subfields of political science and sociology. We are explicit in conceptualizing civil resistance as a form of unconventional warfare, albeit one that employs different weapons and applies force differently. The literature on contentious politics has long explored the relationship between methods and outcomes. Recent scholarship in security studies has explored similar questions.<sup>20</sup> Others in the discipline deal with the concept of strategic effectiveness in an indirect, if somewhat peripheral, way. For instance, in his seminal work on the political economy of rebellion, Jeremy Weinstein (2007) argues that activist rebellions are more likely than opportunistic rebellions to achieve their strategic objectives. Activist rebellions, which are dependent on social support, are more likely to target opponents selectively. Opportunistic rebellions target indiscriminately, thereby undermining their public support.

Wood (2000, 2003) argues that transitions to democracy are likely when insurgents are able to successfully raise the costs to economic elites of maintaining the status quo, a process that emerges when labor unions and worker parties strike over an extended period. DeNardo's work (1985) on mass movements also demonstrates that methods and outcomes of revolutions are related, with disruption and mass mobilization being key determinants of revolutionary success. However, Weinstein (2007), Wood (2000, 2003), and DeNardo (1985) all remain agnostic as to how the methods of resistance—nonviolent or violent—could affect the outcomes of resistance campaigns.

Following those who have analyzed nonviolent campaigns through the lens of strategic theory, we are similarly interested in the relationship between strategy and outcome (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Ganz 2010; Helvey 2004; Popovic et al. 2007; Sharp 1973). Our perspective does not assume that nonviolent resistance methods can melt the hearts of repressive regimes or dictators. Instead, we argue that as with some successful violent movements, nonviolent campaigns can impose costly sanctions on their opponents, resulting in strategic gains. We join a long line of scholars concerned with the strategic effectiveness of different tactical and operational choices (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Sharp 1973; Zunes 1994).

What is perhaps obvious is our voluntaristic approach to the study of resistance. In this book, we make the case that voluntaristic features of campaigns, notably those related to the skills of the resisters, are often better predictors of success than structural determinants. On the surface, this argu-

ment immediately puts us at odds with structural explanations of outcomes such as political opportunity approaches. Such approaches argue that movements will succeed and fail based on the opening and closing of opportunities created by the structure of the political order. As Tarrow has argued, "political opportunity structures are 'consistent dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action'" (Tarrow 1998, 18). Let us briefly discuss how our perspective differs from this approach.

In our study, a political opportunity approach might suggest that nonviolent campaigns succeed so often because the regime is undergoing a transition, signaling to the opposition that the time is right to go on the offensive. McAdam argues that "most contemporary theories of revolution start from much the same premise, arguing that revolutions owe less to the efforts of insurgents than to the work of systemic crises which render the existing regime weak and vulnerable to challenge from virtually any quarter" (1996a, 24).<sup>21</sup>

What we have found, however, is that the political opportunity approach fails to explain why some movements succeed in the direst of political circumstances where chances of success seem grim, whereas other campaigns fail in political circumstances that might seem more favorable. Such explanatory deficiencies leave us wondering how the actions of the groups themselves shape the outcomes of their campaigns.

For instance, a common misperception about nonviolent resistance is that it can succeed only against liberal, democratic regimes espousing universalistic values like respect for human rights. Besides the implicit and false assumption that democracies do not commit mass human rights abuses, the empirical record does not support this argument. As Kurt Schock writes, the historical record actually points to the opposite conclusion:

In fact, nonviolent action has been effective in brutally repressive contexts, and it has been ineffective in open democratic polities. Repression, of course, constrains the ability of challengers to organize, communicate, mobilize, and engage in collective action, and magnifies the risk of participation in collective action. Nevertheless, repression is only one of many factors that influence the trajectories of campaigns of nonviolent action, not the sole determinant of their trajectories. (Schock 2003, 706)

The claim that nonviolent resistance could never work against genocidal foes like Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin is the classic straw man put forward to demonstrate the inherent limitations of this form of struggle. While it is possible that nonviolent resistance could not be used effectively once genocide has broken out in full force (or that it is inherently inferior to armed struggle in such circumstances), this claim is not backed by any strong empirical evidence (Summy 1994). Collective nonviolent struggle was not used with any strategic forethought during World War II, nor was it ever contemplated as an overall strategy for resisting the Nazis. Violent resistance, which some groups attempted for ending Nazi occupation, was also an abject failure.

However, scholars have found that certain forms of collective nonviolent resistance were, in fact, occasionally successful in resisting Hitler's occupation policies. The case of the Danish population's resistance to German occupation is an example of partially effective civil resistance in an extremely difficult environment (Ackerman and DuVall 2000).<sup>22</sup> The famous case of the Rosenstraße protests, when German women of Aryan descent stood for a week outside a detention center on the Rosenstraße in Berlin demanding the release of their Jewish husbands, who were on the verge of being deported to concentration camps, is a further example of limited gains against a genocidal regime brought about by civil resistance. The German women, whose numbers increased as the protests continued and they attracted more attention, were sufficiently disruptive with their sustained nonviolent protests that the Nazi officials eventually released their Jewish husbands (Mazower 2008; Semelin 1993; Stoltzfus 1996). Of course, the civil resistance to Nazi occupation occurred in the context of an Allied military campaign against the Axis powers, which was ultimately decisive in defeating Hitler. Regardless, the notion that nonviolent action can be successful only if the adversary does not use violent repression is neither theoretically nor historically substantiated. In fact, we show how, under certain circumstances, regime violence can backfire and lead to the strengthening of the nonviolent challenge group.

A competing approach, resource mobilization theory, suggests that campaigns succeed when resources converge around given preferences, allowing for mobilization to occur regardless of political opportunities. A resource mobilization approach would suggest that "the dynamics of a movement depend in important ways on its resources and organization," with a focus on entrepreneurs "whose success is determined by the availability of resources"

(Weinstein 2007, 47). However, this perspective does not account for the ways in which the actions of the opponent may account for the success or failure of campaigns when they deploy their own resources to either counter or outmaneuver the challenge group.

Instead of attempting to fit our explanation within one of the two prevailing approaches, we instead view our approach as an interactive one that draws on a contentious politics approach. Such a perspective can be justified by the fact that the structure of the political environment will necessarily shape and constrain the perceptions of resistance leaders, whereas the actions of resistance movements will often have distinguishable and independent effects on the structure of the system. This approach follows from a number of recent works in social movement studies and security studies (Arreguín-Toft 2005; Schock 2005; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2000, 2003).

#### Civil Resistance Research in Context

Readers familiar with the literature on civil resistance may wonder how our work differs from the canonical literature in this field. The seminal works on nonviolent resistance by Gene Sharp, Robert Helvey, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Krueger, Ackerman and Jack DuVall, Stephen Zunes, Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, Kurt Schock, Mary E. King, and others have all advanced our understanding of strategic nonviolent action in important ways.

Sharp's three-volume opus, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, established the theoretical foundation for nonviolent action. It reads as a handbook of nonviolent resistance, explaining the theory of power and the different methods of nonviolent action and the ways that nonviolent action can affect the adversary (conversion, persuasion, accommodation, and coercion). Sharp's work is seminal; it provides a unified theory on the strategic mechanisms through which civil resistance can work.

Robert Helvey builds on much of Sharp's original foundation in his work on how to act strategically during the prosecution of a nonviolent conflict (2004). He identifies similarities between civil resistance and military strategy, providing a handbook of sorts for how to identify campaign goals, develop strategic plans, and operational problems movements face during a campaign.

Our book is distinct in several ways. First, although Sharp's and Helvey's volumes provide a theoretical gold mine, they do not attempt to test their assertions empirically. Our book is the first attempt to comprehensively test

many of the ideas Sharp and Helvey have developed. Second, Sharp's and Helvey's comparisons with violent resistance are implicit; they simply present nonviolent resistance as an effective strategy in asymmetrical conflict. In our study, we explicitly compare nonviolent and violent resistance to test the hypothesis that nonviolent resistance is indeed a more effective strategy.

In Ackerman and Kruegler's *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, the authors develop a framework informed by strategic theory for analyzing the outcomes of nonviolent resistance campaigns. The book features multiple case studies of successful and failed nonviolent action, from which the authors generalize twelve principles of successful nonviolent action. Although the book is highly analytical, the case studies are inductive in nature: their purpose is to find patterns about why nonviolent campaigns succeed rather than to test hypotheses.

Ackerman and DuVall's book *A Force More Powerful* has been perhaps the most widely read book on nonviolent action. The book is empirical, featuring descriptive accounts of nonviolent campaigns ranging from Russia to South Africa. One of the most accessible books on nonviolent conflict, it was adapted into an Emmy-nominated documentary series. Recently the authors have sponsored the development of a video game named after the book, the purpose of which is to train scholars and activists in the tactics and strategy of nonviolent resistance. The book is not intended to be an analytical exploration of why nonviolent resistance succeeds compared with violent resistance, nor does it attempt to control for other factors that might predict the success or failure of movements. Our study expands the universe of cases, explicitly compares nonviolent and violent resistance, tests theoretical hypotheses concerning the mechanisms that lead to success, and controls for other factors that might account for different outcomes. We do, however, focus far less on the dynamics of violent unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla warfare and violent insurgency.

Stephen Zunes, Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, and Kurt Schock have all contributed to the academic understanding of the conditions under which nonviolent resistance succeeds and fails. Their works share a comparative case study approach to explaining individual cases or illuminating patterns in nonviolent resistance activity (Roberts and Garton Ash 2009; Schock 2005; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999). Much of our argument is compatible with findings in Zunes's various works, although our aim is to explain broad patterns rather than individual cases. Roberts and

Garton Ash similarly attempt to explain the dynamics of nonviolent resistance in a diverse range of cases. Other authors have examined single case studies and associated phenomena in great depth (Bleiker 1993; Clark 2000; Dajani 1994; Eglitis 1993; Huxley 1990; Martin 2007; McCarthy and Sharp 1997; Miniotaité 2002; Parkman 1988, 1990; Roberts and Garton Ash 2009; Sharp 2005; Stephan 2010; Stoltzfus 1996). The goal of these contributors, however, is not always to explain campaign success or failure but rather to explore a number of social movement problems and questions related to their cases. Thus their works demonstrate some important lessons but not necessarily about why and when civil resistance works.

In *Unarmed Insurrections*, sociologist Kurt Schock compares successful and failed nonviolent, prodemocracy campaigns against nondemocratic regimes. This work comes much closer to the analytical purposes of our book. Schock compares six nonviolent campaigns in nondemocracies to identify patterns among the trajectories of these campaigns. He challenges the political opportunity approach, and argues that strategic factors can help explain the outcomes of the campaigns. Most important, Schock's work bridges the structure-agency divide and analyzes the iterative, interactive nature of political opportunities and strategic choice. Specifically, Schock argues that tactical innovation, resilience, and the shifting between methods of concentration and methods of dispersion can help to explain the divergent outcomes of different campaigns.

Vincent Boudreau also analyzes the outcomes of prodemocracy movements in Southeast Asia, using a compelling contentious politics model (2004). However, he does not focus on the relative effectiveness of nonviolent and violent action, instead exploring the interaction between different modes of repression employed by dictators in Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia and the impact of these forms of repression on the protestors. He is explicitly critical of the possibility of accurately representing these conflicts using quantitative analysis, instead arguing in favor of viewing each conflict as a complex system of its own (2004, 3).

Our findings are highly compatible with Schock's and share much in common with Boudreau's as well, notwithstanding methodological differences. But our argument about the primacy of participation in nonviolent resistance appears unique in this literature. Moreover, as with the Ackerman and Kruegler book, our study expands the universe of cases to include antioccupation and secession campaigns in addition to regime-change cam-

paigns. Our study is not limited to Southeast Asia, nor are our cases restricted to nondemocratic targets. Instead, we attempt to comprehensively examine major nonviolent and violent campaigns all across the globe, against all types of targets, from 1900 to 2006.

Readers familiar with Ivan Arreguín-Toft's argument in *How the Weak Win Wars* may see some similarities to our argument. In his book, Arreguín-Toft argues that weak powers sometimes win wars when they employ indirect strategies against stronger powers. That is, if the stronger power is employing conventional war strategies, a weaker power that uses unconventional or guerrilla war will be likely to succeed. For instance, the British conventional army succumbed to the guerrilla war waged by American colonists during the Revolutionary War (though, as mentioned earlier, the armed insurgency followed years of nonviolent civil resistance). On the other hand, a weaker power that uses conventional strategies against a stronger power relying on conventional strategies will fail. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrates that point: the militarily inferior Iraqi army was unable to successfully take on Coalition forces.

Conversely, if a stronger power employs unconventional strategies against a weaker power's conventional strategies, the weaker power will win. For instance, Hitler's air bombing of British civilian targets did not force the British into compliance. Instead, the attacks emboldened the British against the Germans (Arreguín-Toft 2001, 108). But when a stronger power employs unconventional strategies against a weak power also using unconventional strategies, the stronger power will win. The Russian government has used "barbaric" strategies against Chechen rebels, effectively crushing the Chechen insurgency.

While we do not dispute Arreguín-Toft's findings, we illuminate a new dimension in his typology, which is the use of strategic nonviolent action as an indirect strategy against a militarily superior opponent. When Arreguín-Toft describes indirect strategies for weaker powers, he refers to two types of strategies: direct defense, which he defines as "the use of armed forces to thwart an adversary's attempt to capture or destroy values such as territory, population, and strategic resources," and guerrilla warfare, defined as "the organization of a portion of society for the purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct confrontation" (2001, 103). We argue that unarmed, civil resistance can be even more effective

than direct defense or guerrilla warfare, both of which are armed strategies against militarily superior opponents.

Our results are also consistent with Max Abraham's findings, which suggest that terrorist activities that target civilians are less effective than guerrilla warfare strategies that target policy and military personnel (2006). But our findings extend his thesis further, in that we argue that in most cases all types of violent campaigns are likely to be less effective than well-managed nonviolent campaigns.

What all these works, including ours, have in common is a call for scholars to rethink power and its sources in any given society or polity. Although it is often operationalized as a state's military and economic capacity, our findings demonstrate that power actually depends on the consent of the civilian population, consent that can be withdrawn and reassigned to more legitimate or more compelling parties.

### **Squaring the Circle: The Effectiveness of Violence?**

Some scholars, such as Robert Pape, have developed recently theses on the efficacy of violent conflict. In particular, some argue that terrorism—especially suicide terrorism—is an effective coercive strategy, especially against democracies (2003, 2005). Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson have also discovered that violent insurgency is growing in effectiveness—against democracies in particular (2009). Given these authors' findings, there are some surface discrepancies with our findings. We address each of these arguments in turn.

First, Pape argues that suicide terrorism is an effective punishment strategy against democracies (2003, 2005). Suicide bombers convey both capability and resolve to soft targets in democracies, demonstrating to these countries that continued occupation will result in protracted, escalating, indiscriminate war against the country's civilian population. Such acts lead to a decline in morale in the democracy, which ultimately judges that withdrawal from the occupied territory is less costly than the occupation. In his study, five out of the eleven suicide bombing campaigns since 1980 have achieved at least partial success.

Pape's argument and empirics have been widely criticized (see, for instance, Ashworth et al. 2008). Yet if we take his argument at face value, we can offer yet another criticism, which could be applied to almost all scholars

whose research tests the efficacy of different violent methods. Such scholars often assume or argue that violence is effective, but compared with what? In particular, Pape makes no attempt to compare the relative efficacy of suicide terrorism against alternative strategies. Even in some of his most prominent cases—Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories—we have seen mass, nonviolent resistance perform effectively where violent insurgencies have failed. In the Lebanese case, the 2005 Cedar Revolution involved more than a million Lebanese demonstrators forcing Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanese soil. And, as shown in chapter 5, the First Intifada moved the Palestinian self-determination movement further than the Palestine Liberation Organization's violent campaign that preceded it, or the Al-Aqsa Intifada that succeeded it.

In another example, Lyall and Wilson argue that violent insurgencies are becoming more effective against highly mechanized militaries, which prove to be unwieldy in urban settings against well-camouflaged insurgents (2009). They show that since 1975 states have succeeded in crushing insurgencies only 24 percent of the time. In their study, they determine success from the state's perspective, such that complete defeat of the insurgents is considered a success, whereas a draw or a loss to insurgents is considered a failure. When one looks more closely, however, one can see that their primary finding—that violent insurgencies have succeeded in over 75 percent of cases since 1976—is based on data in which nearly 48 percent of the cases were stalemates. Thus only 29.5 percent of their insurgencies since 1976 actually succeeded in defeating their state adversaries, a statistic that is much closer to our own. Lyall and Wilson also exclude ongoing campaigns from their findings, whereas we code such cases as failures through 2006.<sup>23</sup>

The difference in measurement is one way that our findings diverge from Lyall and Wilson's. But perhaps the most important difference is that they do not compare the relative effectiveness of violent insurgency with nonviolent campaigns. If we analyze the success rates of nonviolent campaigns since 1976, we see a much higher rate of nonviolent campaign success (57 percent).

Thus our study represents a departure from techniques used by those arguing that violent insurgency is effective. As Baldwin argues, "Only comparative analysis of the prospective success of alternative instruments provides policy-relevant knowledge" (2000, 176). Our approach involves the relative comparison of nonviolent and violent campaigns, which sheds more light on how unsuccessful violent campaigns really are.<sup>24</sup>

## WIDER IMPLICATIONS

Beyond scholarly contributions, this research possesses a number of important implications for public policy. Research regarding the successes and failures of nonviolent campaigns can provide insight into the most effective ways for external actors—governmental and nongovernmental—to aid such movements. From the perspective of an outside state, providing support to nonviolent campaigns can sometimes aid the movements but also introduces a new set of dilemmas, including the free-rider problem and the potential loss of local legitimacy. This study strongly supports the view that sanctions and state support for nonviolent campaigns work best when they are coordinated with the support of local opposition groups; but they are never substitutes.

For instance, although there is no evidence that external actors can successfully initiate or sustain mass nonviolent mobilization, targeted forms of external support have been useful in some cases, like the international boycotts targeting the apartheid regime in South Africa. The existence of organized solidarity groups that maintained steady pressure on governments allied with the target regimes proved to be very helpful, suggesting that "extending the battlefield" is sometimes necessary for opposition groups to enhance their leverage over the target. Lending diplomatic support to human rights activists, independent civil society groups, and democratic opposition leaders while penalizing regimes (or threatening penalties) that target unarmed activists with violent repression may be another way that governments can improve the probability of nonviolent campaign success. Coordinated multinational efforts that used a combination of positive and negative sanctions to isolate egregious rights violators supported successful civil resistance movements in South Africa and Eastern Europe.

## PLAN OF THE BOOK

The remainder of the study examines the specific mechanisms by which nonviolent campaigns succeed and fail. It does so by interchanging quantitative and qualitative analyses of nonviolent and violent campaigns in the Middle East (Iran and the Palestinian Territories) and Southeast Asia (the Philippines and Burma). Each of the four cases features periods of both violent and civil resistance against repressive regimes, but with varying degrees of success. This allows us to more closely examine the conditions under which nonviolent and violent campaigns succeed and fail, both within and across the cases.

The book proceeds as follows. First, in chapter 2, we introduce the general argument of the study and explore how this argument converges and diverges with the findings of other scholars. We argue that civil resistance campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns at overcoming barriers to participation, an important prerequisite of success.

In chapter 3, we explore the major alternative arguments—that regime features may independently affect the outcomes of the nonviolent or violent conflicts, or that the origins and outcomes of resistance campaigns are endogenous. First, we test whether opponent regime type (i.e., democracy or nondemocracy), capabilities, or use of violent repression against the challenge group reduces the likelihood of success for nonviolent resistance. We also test the effects of time, region, and campaign goal on the probability of success. We find that even when taking into account structural features, nonviolent resistance is still a more effective strategy than violent resistance.

Chapter 3 also addresses the issue of endogeneity head-on, that is, whether violent campaigns fail because they emerge in conditions in which failure is extremely likely, thus explaining their poor success rates relative to nonviolent campaigns. We find that nonviolent and violent insurgencies are likely to emerge in very similar circumstances, such that their outcomes cannot be explained exclusively on the basis of endogeneity.

In part 2, we compare nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns and their outcomes in Iran, the Palestinian Territories, the Philippines, and Burma. We explain the case selection in detail before the substantive chapters begin. Chapter 4 discusses the Iranian Revolution (1977–1979). In this case, violent campaigns failed to dislodge the Shah, whereas the nonviolent campaign succeeded. Chapter 5 explains why violent Palestinian campaigns orchestrated by an exiled leadership achieved little or no success before the First Intifada (1987–1992), whereas the mass popular uprising that originated inside the occupied territories achieved partial success through some important Israeli concessions.

Chapter 6 deals with the successful case of the People Power movement in the Philippines (1983–1986), which ousted Ferdinand Marcos from power. This mass uprising achieved what the Maoist and Muslim-led insurgencies in that country had been unable to achieve. Chapter 7 identifies a case of failed nonviolent resistance: the Burmese prodemocracy uprising of 1988. Both nonviolent and violent campaigns failed in this case, which provides a useful deviating outcome for comparison.

Part 3 explores the implications of this research across multiple dimensions. First, in chapter 8, we discuss the consequences of violent insurgency, particularly violent insurgent success. Our statistical evidence suggests that countries in which violent insurgencies exist are more likely to backslide into authoritarianism or civil war than countries where nonviolent campaigns exist, which often become more stable, democratic regimes.

Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the key findings, highlighting how these findings make a contribution to the literature. This chapter also argues for the incorporation of nonviolent conflict into security studies inquiry and suggests ways to improve and expand upon our study. The last section identifies the policy implications derived from this research.

Although not the final word in any sense, we hope that this book challenges the conventional wisdom concerning the effectiveness of nonviolent struggle and encourages scholars and policy makers to take seriously the role that civilians play in actively prosecuting conflict without resorting to violence.



*What is a rebel? A man who says no.*

ALBERT CAMUS

### WHAT EXPLAINS THE SUCCESS OF NONVIOLENT

resistance campaigns relative to violent campaigns? We argue that a critical source of the success of nonviolent resistance is mass participation, which can erode or remove a regime's main sources of power when the participants represent diverse sectors of society. All resistance campaigns—violent and nonviolent—seek to build the personnel bases of their campaigns. Personnel are recruited for their special skills, knowledge, material resources, and their willingness to fight and support the resistance. The quantity and quality of campaign participation is a critical factor in determining the outcome of resistance struggles (DeNardo 1985; Lichbach 1994; Weinstein 2007; Wickham-Crowley 1992).

This chapter has two aims. First, we establish that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to attract higher levels of participation than violent campaigns because the barriers to participation are lower. Second, we argue that high levels of participation in resistance campaigns can activate numerous mechanisms that improve the odds of success. Such mobilization is not always manifested in the form of mass rallies and street demonstrations but rather can manifest in numerous forms of social, political, and economic noncooperation. The tactical and strategic advantages of high levels of diverse participation explain—in large part—the historical success of nonviolent campaigns.

### PARTICIPATION DEFINED

We define participation in a resistance campaign as the active and observable engagement of individuals in collective action. As such, when measuring campaign participation, we use estimated counts of observed individuals.<sup>1</sup> Instead of constructing cumulative counts, which would be nearly impossible, we count the maximum number of estimated participants that participated in peak events in the campaign. For example, if a resistance

campaign holds mass protests in, say, September with 12,000 people, November with 24,000 people, and December with 20,000 people, we use the November figure for our estimate. That is, we code that particular campaign as having 24,000 participants. We use estimates of armed participants to generate figures about the level of participation in violent insurgencies.<sup>2</sup> Of the 323 resistance campaigns analyzed in this book, we were able to collect reliable membership data for 259 campaigns—80 nonviolent and 179 violent—by referencing multiple sources that estimated the maximum number of participants in each campaign.<sup>3</sup>

This is a rather strict conceptualization of participation, and we recognize that many forms of participation are impossible to observe, such as providing sanctuary, food, and supplies to guerrillas, raising funds, communicating messages, acting as informants, or refusing to cooperate with government attempts to apprehend insurgents. For instance, for some individuals, simply refusing to report the presence of guerrillas in one's village to state police may be a form of participation in a resistance campaign, albeit one that is more passive and impossible for us to quantify. Recent studies have identified multiple and complex levels of such participation. As Roger Peterson writes, "there are collaborators, neutrals, locally based rebels, mobile fighters, and gradations in between" (2001, 8).

We do not dispute that our definition likely misses many unobserved participants, but we find the definition both necessary and justified for two reasons. First, in our definition of nonviolent resistance participation, civilians are the active and primary prosecutors of the conflict, executing nonviolent methods against the adversary with varying degrees of risk. This is quite different from the typical conception of civilians as serving a supportive role to combatants.

Second, we assume that some types of unobservable participation occur in approximately equal measure in both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns. Out of necessity, we focus exclusively on the participants that make themselves visible to observers and opponents as a rough measure of campaign mobilization. The risks of visibility should be similar for both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns, which in our study often involve illegal and at times high-risk actions against powerful and repressive adversaries.

We do wish to avoid the misconception, however, that civil resistance always assumes the form of mass protests in the streets. Nonviolent resistance is just as likely to take the form of stay-aways, sit-ins, occupations, economic



boycotts, and so forth, in which the numbers of participants are extremely difficult to estimate. When such estimations are possible because of reliable recording of such events, we include them in our figures.

## HOW TO MOBILIZE?

Mass mobilization occurs for many different reasons, which multiple scholars have analyzed in great depth (see, for instance, Kalyvas 2006; Peterson 2001). In this chapter, we do not seek to explain why mobilization occurs. Rather, we argue that once mobilization begins, a nonviolent resistance campaign has wider appeal than a violent one, thereby enlarging the personal base of the former and bringing more assets and resources to the fight against a state opponent.

Skeptics may disagree. It is often argued, for instance, that violent insurgencies provide immediate results—such as loot, prestige, score settling, or territorial gains—that give them more appeal than nonviolent resistance. Beyond the prospect of achieving political objectives, the potential to obtain material payoffs from resistance leaders, to seize territory and weapons, to gain control over lucrative extractive industries, trade, and trafficking routes, to inflict casualties, or to exact revenge are factors that may attract some recruits to violent resistance.

The psychosocial dimensions of participation in armed conflict have similarly attracted a great deal of attention. Frantz Fanon famously advocated armed resistance on the grounds that it bestows feelings of communal solidarity through actively fighting against injustice while being willing to die for a cause greater than self (Boserup and Mack 1974; Fanon 1961).<sup>4</sup> Violence may have its own attraction, especially for young people, for whom the allure may be further perpetuated by cultural references and religious defenses of martyrdom (Breckenridge 1998).<sup>5</sup>

Despite its supposed appeal, however, the resort to violence is rare at both individual and group levels and therefore may not have the allure that some theorists ascribe to it (Collins 2008, 20). On the whole, physical, informational, commitment, and moral considerations tend to give nonviolent campaigns an advantage when it comes to mobilizing participants, which reinforces the strategic benefits to participation.

We have found strong evidence suggesting that nonviolent campaigns have been, on average, more likely to have a larger number of participants than violent campaigns. The average nonviolent campaign has over 200,000

TABLE 2.1 TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS, 1900-2006

PEAK MEMBERSHIP	YEARS	LOCATION	TARGET	TYPE	OUTCOME
4,500,000	1937-45	CHINA	JAPANESE OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	FAILURE
2,000,000	1978-9	IRAN	PAHLAVI REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
2,000,000	1983-6	PHILIPPINES	MARCOS REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1,000,000	1988	BURMA	MILITARY JUNTA	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
1,000,000	2006	MEXICO	CALDERON REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
1000000	2005	LEBANON	SYRIAN INFLUENCE	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1993-9	NIGERIA	MILITARY REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1989	CHINA	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
1000000	1984-5	BRAZIL	MILITARY RULE	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1967-8	CHINA	ANTI-MAOISTS	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
1000000	1922-49	CHINA	NATIONALIST REGIME	VIOLENT	SUCCESS
700000	1990-1	RUSSIA	ANTI-COMMUNIST	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
700000	1983-9	CHILE	PINOCHET REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
550000	1956-7	CHINA	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
500000	2002-3	MADAGASCAR	RADSIIRAKA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	1989	UKRAINE	KUCHMA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	2001	PHILIPPINES	ESTRADA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	1989	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
500000	1963	GREECE	KARAMANLIS REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
400000	1991-3	MADAGASCAR	RADSIIRAKA REGIME	NONVIOLENT	SUCCESS
400000	1953	EAST GERMANY	COMMUNIST REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
400000	1941-45	SOVIET UNION	NAZI OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	FAILURE
340000	1958-75	VIETNAM	U.S. OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	SUCCESS
300000	1990-5	NIGERIA	NIGERIAN REGIME	NONVIOLENT	FAILURE
300000	1944	POLAND	NAZI OCCUPATION	VIOLENT	FAILURE

members—about 150,000 more active participants than the average violent campaign. A look at the twenty-five largest campaigns yields several immediate impressions. First, twenty of the largest campaigns have been nonviolent, whereas five have been violent. Second, of the nonviolent campaigns, fourteen have been outright successes (70 percent), whereas among the five violent campaigns, only two have been successful (40 percent). In

other words, among these massive campaigns, nonviolent campaigns have been much more likely to succeed than violent campaigns.<sup>6</sup>

The Iranian Revolution of 1977–1979 is illustrative. Although violent insurgencies such as those of the fedayeen and mujahideen had resisted the Shah since the 1960s, they were able to attract only several thousand followers. Pahlavi's regime crushed the armed groups before they produced meaningful change in the regime. The nonviolent revolution that emerged between 1977 and 1978, however, attracted several million participants and included nationwide protests and boycotts involving all sectors of society that paralyzed the economy and eroded the Shah's most important pillars of support.

These trends are further borne out in the data set. Nonviolent campaigns are persistently associated with higher levels of membership, even when controlling for the population size of the entire country. Consider table 2.2, which shows the effects of a nonviolent resistance type on the number of participants, controlling for population size.<sup>7</sup> Thus nonviolent resistance campaigns have been associated with higher levels of participation. In this section, we argue that the physical, informational, and moral barriers to participation are lower in nonviolent campaigns than in violent campaigns.

### Physical Barriers

Active participation in a resistance campaign requires variable levels of physical ability. The physical risks and costs of participation in a violent resistance campaign may be prohibitively high for many potential members.

TABLE 2.2 THE EFFECT OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE ON NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS

	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED
RESISTANCE IS PRIMARILY NONVIOLENT	2.26*** (.29)
POPULATION, LOGGED	.23* (.13)
CONSTANT	6.70*** (1.17)
N	163
PROB > F	.0000
R <sup>2</sup>	.3543

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS: \*\*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*  $p < .1$ . ORDINARY-LEAST-SQUARES REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AROUND TARGET COUNTRY.

Actively joining a violent campaign may require physical skills such as agility and endurance, willingness to train, ability to handle and use weapons, and often isolation from society at large. While certain of these qualities, including endurance, willingness to sacrifice, and training are also applicable to participation in nonviolent resistance, the typical guerrilla regimen may appeal only to a small portion of any given population.

Physical barriers to participation may be lower for nonviolent resistance since the menu of tactics and activities available to nonviolent activists is broad and includes a wide spectrum, ranging from high-risk confrontational tactics to low-risk discreet tactics.<sup>8</sup> Generally, participation in labor strikes, consumer boycotts, lockdowns, and sit-ins does not require strength, agility, or youth. Participation in a nonviolent campaign is open to female and elderly populations, whereas participation in a violent resistance campaign is often, though not always, physically prohibitive. Although female operatives—such as female suicide bombers and guerrillas—have sometimes been active in violent campaigns in Sri Lanka, Iraq, Pakistan, Palestine, El Salvador, and East Timor, they are nevertheless exceptions in most cases.

### Informational Difficulties

Scholars have found that individuals are more likely to engage in protest activity when they expect large numbers of people to participate (Goldstone 1994; Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1989; Kurzman 1996, 2004; Lichbach 1994; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1994; Olson 1965; Rasler 1996; Schelling 1978; Tullock 1977). To successfully recruit members, campaigns must publicize their activities to demonstrate their goals, abilities, and existing numbers to potential recruits. Because of the high risks associated with violent activity, however, movement activists may be limited in how much information they can provide. They may need to remain underground, thereby exacerbating informational problems. Although violent acts, including assassinations, ambushes, bombings, and kidnappings, are public and often attract significant media attention providing signals of the campaign's abilities, the majority of the campaign's operational realities—including information about the numbers of active members—often remain unseen and unknown.<sup>9</sup> The absence of visible signs of opposition strength is, therefore, problematic from the perspective of recruitment. Thus violent resistance may be at a disadvantage in this regard, since the actual number of activists may not be explicit. The counterargument, of course, is that dramatic acts of

violence achieve a bigger bang for the buck. Whereas nonviolent organization requires communication and coordination involving larger numbers of people, a single suicide bomber can wreak great damage while attracting significant media attention at relatively little cost. Violent campaigns often rely on propaganda materials that try to exaggerate their size and strength to attract recruits. In the propaganda realm, violent campaigns may have a tactical advantage over many nonviolent campaigns.

On the other hand, nonviolent, public tactics have important demonstration effects, which help address the informational problem. Nonviolent campaigns sometimes include clandestine activities (e.g., the use of samizdat underground publications during the Polish Solidarity struggle, or the actual planning of nonviolent campaigns by the leadership), particularly during the early stages when the resistance is most vulnerable to regime repression and decapitation. Typically, however, nonviolent campaigns rely less on underground activities than do armed struggles.<sup>10</sup> When communities observe open, mass support and collective acts of defiance, their perceptions of risk may decline, reducing constraints on participation. This contention is supported by critical-mass theories of collective action, which contend that protestors base their perceptions of protest opportunities on existing patterns of opposition activity (Kurzban 1996, 154). Courage breeds courage, particularly when those engaged in protest activities are ordinary people who would be conformist, law-abiding citizens under typical circumstances. Media coverage amplifies the demonstration effects of their acts of defiance.

Another factor that enhances participation in nonviolent campaigns is the festival-like atmosphere that often accompanies nonviolent rallies and demonstrations—as exemplified by the recent nonviolent campaigns in Serbia, Ukraine, Lebanon, and Egypt—where concerts, singing, and street theater attracted large numbers of people (particularly young people) interested in having fun while fighting for a political cause. Humor and satire, which have featured prominently in nonviolent campaigns (less so in armed campaigns), have helped break down barriers of fear and promote solidarity among victims of state-sponsored oppression (Kishitani 2010).

### **Moral Barriers**

Moral barriers may constrain potential recruits to resistance campaigns, but such constraints may inhibit participation in nonviolent resistance far less than participation in violent activities. Although an individual's decision to

resist the status quo may follow a certain amount of moral introspection, taking up weapons and killing adds a new moral dimension. Unwillingness to commit violent acts or to support armed groups necessarily disqualifies segments of the population that sympathize with the resistance but are reluctant to translate that sympathy into violence.<sup>11</sup> For violent resistance campaigns, the leadership may need to rely on the proportion of the population that is willing to use violence against the adversary and its supporters, while settling for sympathy and passive support from the rest of the population.

Nonviolent resistance campaigns, however, can potentially mobilize the entire aggrieved population without the need to face moral barriers. Although the moral quandaries associated with nonviolent resistance might involve putting at risk one's freedom, family well-being, life and livelihood, joining such a campaign "requires less soul-searching than joining a violent one. Violent methods raise troublesome questions about whether the ends justify the means, and generally force the people who use them to take substantial risks" (DeNardo 1985, 58).

### **Commitment Problems**

Beyond physical, informational, and moral barriers, nonviolent resistance campaigns may offer an opportunity to participate to people with varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance. Campaigns that rely primarily on violent resistance must depend on participants who have high levels of both commitment and risk tolerance for four principal reasons.

First, the new recruit to a violent campaign may require more training than a recruit to a nonviolent campaign, creating a lag between volunteering and participation. This lag—and the strenuous requirements for participation in a violent campaign—may reduce the number of people who join a violent campaign on a whim.<sup>12</sup>

Second, violent campaigns typically enforce higher levels of commitment at the outset. Screening potential participants is much more intense in violent movements. Often new recruits to violent movements must undertake a violent act to demonstrate their commitment. This is a further inhibition to participation in armed struggles, because potential recruits may wish to eschew drastic screening processes or movement leaders may find it hard to trust new recruits.

Third, during the prosecution of a conflict, participants in nonviolent campaigns can often return to their jobs, daily lives, and families with lower

risk than a participant in a violent campaign.<sup>3</sup> Compared with those in armed struggle, participants in civil resistance can more easily retain anonymity, which means that they can often commit acts of resistance without making major life sacrifices. This is particularly true when a campaign uses nonviolent methods of dispersion (a concept we elaborate on later), such as stay-at-home strikes or a consumer boycott, in which cooperation is withdrawn without providing the state with a tangible target for repression (Burrowes 1996, 224–25; Schock 2005, 52). The commitment required by people who join violent campaigns often prevents them from resuming their lives during or after the conflict, and they are more likely to go underground to evade state security.

Fourth, nonviolent resistance offers a greater repertoire of lower-risk actions. Although nonviolent struggle is rarely casualty-free, as the nonviolent struggle in Egypt recently demonstrated, the price of participating (and being caught) in armed struggle is often death. The possibility of accidental death during training exercises or through friendly fire is omnipresent as well. Thus the likelihood of being killed while carrying out one's duties as an armed insurgent is high, whereas many lower-risk tactics are available to participants in a nonviolent resistance campaign. The wearing of opposition insignia, the coordinated banging of pots and pans and honking of horns, the creation of underground schools, participation in candlelight vigils, and the refusal to obey regime orders are a few examples of less-risky nonviolent tactics that have been used by groups around the world (Sharp 1973).

Mobilization during the Iranian Revolution demonstrates the latter point. Notwithstanding the Shah's deep unpopularity among large numbers of Iranians, many Iranian citizens were unwilling to participate in protest activity until the revolution had attracted mass support, which occurred only after nonviolent popular struggle replaced guerrilla violence as the primary mode of resistance (Kurzman 1996). A similar dynamic could be seen in the 1988 popular ouster of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile, and the 1986 People Power revolution against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, where armed challenges to the dictatorships invited harsh regime reprisals without attracting mass support or threatening the regime's grip on power, whereas nonviolent actions opened up space for broad-based, multisectoral participation (Ackerman and Du Vall 2000; Boudreau 2004; Schock 2005). The dynamics of participation discussed thus far point in one direction. They suggest that nonviolent campaigns will be more successful at generat-

ing large bases of participants. When large numbers of people in key sectors of society stop obeying and engage in prolonged acts of social, political, and economic disruption, they may fundamentally alter the relationship between ruler and ruled. If mass participation is associated with campaign success, then nonviolent campaigns have an advantage over violent ones.

#### **PARTICIPATION AND SUCCESS GO TOGETHER**

We have established how and why nonviolent resistance campaigns are able to attract a larger number of active participants than violent struggles. But is mass participation truly important? After all, many regimes specialize in controlling large populations. Some might suspect that a smaller number of well-armed comrades competing against an unsuspecting military and government could have better odds than a million unarmed protestors engaging a repressive opponent (see, e.g., DeNardo 1985). This expectation is certainly corroborated by several empirical examples: the Cuban Revolution shows the success of small, armed bands, whereas the massacre at Tiananmen Square demonstrates the failure of a large-scale nonviolent campaign.

The data, however, reveal a different pattern. Over space and time, large campaigns are much more likely to succeed than small campaigns. A single unit increase of active participants makes a campaign over 10 percent more likely to achieve its ultimate outcome.<sup>4</sup> Consider figure 2.1, which shows the effects of number of participants per capita on the predicted probability of campaign success. The trend is clear that as membership increases, the probability of success also increases.<sup>5</sup>

We recognize, however, that numbers alone do not guarantee victory in resistance campaigns. As some cases demonstrate, a high number of participants does not automatically translate into success. Some enormous campaigns—like the anticomunist campaigns in East Germany in the 1950s (boasting about four hundred thousand participants) and the anti-Japanese insurgency in China during the 1930s and 1940s (with over 4 million participants)—failed utterly.


Thus, numbers may matter, but they are insufficient to guarantee success. This is because the quality of participation—including the diversity of the resistance participants, strategic and tactical choices made by the opposition, and its ability to adapt and innovate—may be as important as the quantity of participants. As proposed in the preceding, lower barriers to participation enjoyed by nonviolent campaigns will increase not only the size of the

campaign but also the diversity of the campaign. The more diverse the participation in the resistance—in terms of gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ideology, profession, and socioeconomic status—the more difficult it is for the adversary to isolate the participants and adopt a repressive strategy short of maximal and indiscriminate repression. Of course, this does not mean that nonviolent campaigns are immune from regime repression—typically they are not—but it does make the opponent's use of violence more likely to backfire, a point we return to later.

Moreover, thick social networks among members of the resistance and regime actors, including members of the security forces, may produce bonds that can become very important over the course of the resistance. Diverse participation also increases the likelihood of tactical diversity, since different groups and associations are familiar with different forms of resistance and bring unique skills and capacities to the fight, which makes outmaneuvering the opponent and increasing pressure points more plausible.

As with any campaign, strategic factors like achieving unity around shared goals and methods, establishing realistic goals, assessing opponent

FIGURE 2.1 THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION ON THE PROBABILITY OF CAMPAIGN SUCCESS



vulnerabilities and sources of leverage, sequencing tactics, and navigating structural constraints (including regime repression) are also likely to be crucial determinants of campaign outcomes. These strategic factors are independent of the mechanisms we develop in the following but can affect whether the mechanisms actually translate into effectiveness. We emphasize these features more prominently in our case studies. In the meantime, however, we suggest that the execution of any resistance strategy—violent or nonviolent—and the ability to stay in the contest with the adversary depend on the availability of willing recruits.

As such, large-scale and diverse participation may afford a resistance campaign a strategic advantage, which, in turn, increases the pressure points and enhances the leverage that the resistance achieves vis-à-vis its state adversary. The ability of nonviolent campaigns to more easily exploit these advantages of broad-based mobilization, and the high costs of prolonged disobedience and noncooperation by large numbers of dissenters, explain in part why civil resistance has been so much more effective than violent resistance.

#### PARTICIPATION AND MECHANISMS OF LEVERAGE

In this section, we discuss the mechanisms through which broad-based mobilization and the systematic application of nonviolent sanctions by large numbers of people allow nonviolent campaigns to maximize leverage over their adversaries, even when their adversaries appear to have an advantage in terms of military prowess, resources, and other forms of power. Leverage, writes Kurt Schock, is “the ability . . . to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for power” (Schock 2005, 142). Thus leverage is not necessarily dependent on the number of weapons available to a resistance movement but on the ability of the campaign to impose costs on the adversary for maintaining the status quo, or for retaliating against the resistance.

The disruptive effects of violent and nonviolent resistance may raise the political, economic, and military costs for an adversary (DeNardo 1985). The results of sustained disruption include the failure of the government to perform basic functions, a decline in GDP, investment, and tax revenues, loss of power by government elites, and the breakdown of the normal order of society (Wood 2000, 15). The sum total of the domestic and international costs of sustained disruption may cause members of the target regime to accommodate resistance campaigns—or force them to give up power completely.

## Coercion

Violent campaigns physically coerce their adversaries, which may significantly disrupt the status quo.<sup>66</sup> Destroying or damaging infrastructure, killing or threatening government and military elites and local populations, and disrupting the flow of goods and commerce may raise perceptions of ungovernability and continued instability while loosening the regime's grip on power. The more the regime is perceived as illegitimate by the local populace, the more likely it is that the latter will sympathize with the armed insurgents, as the revolutions in Cuba and Vietnam, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, and the ongoing Pashun-led armed resistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrate. But sympathy is not the same as active participation in the resistance.

Beyond attempting to coerce the opponent, a sustained violent resistance campaign may serve an important communicative role. For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) use of terrorism and guerrilla violence from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s is often credited with keeping the Palestinian issue alive internationally. The armed wing of the East Timorese independence movement, the Falintil, similarly used armed attacks against Indonesian military targets to attract media attention and to demonstrate that there was opposition to the Indonesian occupation. The Iranian guerrilla movement similarly justified its use of armed attacks against the Shah's regime as a way of demonstrating that the reality was not as the Shah presented it, and that there was opposition to the monarchy (Behrooz 2004). The Maoist guerrillas in Nepal launched armed attacks against the monarchical regime for years, signaling their opposition and resulting in hundreds of fatalities and prolonged instability in the country.<sup>67</sup> The Taliban continue to use suicide bombings, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and assassinations targeting International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and Afghan government officials and security forces to demonstrate their rejection of the internationally backed regime of President Hamid Karzai.

In the aforementioned cases, however, there is scant evidence of a causal relationship between political violence and political victories, suggesting that disruption should not be confused with victory. Although the armed resistance may have had a symbolic function, many of the major changes that have ultimately occurred in these cited cases—except in Afghanistan, where the insurgency continues—were precipitated by mass, nonviolent

campaigns. In the case of Nepal, for instance, what directly preceded the restoration of democratic rule in Nepal was not armed resistance but a brief mass civil resistance campaign, where even the Maoists chose to put down their guns so that they could participate alongside large numbers of unarmed civilians.

The coercive capacity of nonviolent resistance is not based on violent disruption to the social order. Rather, it is based on the removal of the adversary's key sources of power through sustained acts of protest and noncooperation. Some may argue that nonviolent resistance is powerful only because regimes fear that they will become violent, thereby posing even greater threats. Social movement scholars refer to this dynamic as a "positive radical flank effect." This concept posits that violence may sometimes increase the leverage of challengers, which occurs when states offer selective rewards and opportunities to moderate competitor groups to isolate or thwart the more radical organizations. In other words, the presence of a radical element in the opposition may make the moderate oppositionists in the nonviolent campaign seem more palatable to the regime, thereby contributing to the success of the nonviolent campaign. In this way, some argue that violent and nonviolent campaigns can be symbiotic, in that the presence of both types improves their relative positions.<sup>68</sup>

But opposition violence is just as likely—if not more likely—to have the opposite result. A "negative radical flank effect," or spoiler effect, occurs when another party's violence decreases the leverage of a challenge group. In this case, the presence of an armed challenge group causes the regime's supporters to unify against the threat without making a distinction between violent and nonviolent challenges, which are lumped together as the same threat deserving the same (violent) response.

There is no consensus among social scientists about the conditions under which radical flanks either harm or help a social movement.<sup>69</sup> In our estimation, however, many successful nonviolent campaigns have succeeded because they systematically eroded or removed entirely the regime's sources of power, including the support of the economic and military elites, which may have hesitated to support the opposition if they had suspected that the campaign would turn violent. The more a regime's supporters believe a campaign may become violent, or that their interests will be gutted if the status quo is changed, the more likely that those supporters and potential

participants may perceive the conflict to be a zero-sum game (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 9–13). As a response, regime supporters are likely to unite to counter the perceived threat, while potential participants may eschew participation for the reasons just identified. A unified adversary is much harder to defeat for any resistance campaign. In conflicts perceived as zero-sum, furthermore, it is difficult for erstwhile regime supporters to modify and adapt their ideologies and interests according to shifts in power. Instead, they will fight tooth and nail to keep their grip on power, relying on brutal force if necessary. There is less room for negotiation, compromise, and power sharing when regime members fear that even small losses of power will translate into rolling heads. On the other hand, our central point is that campaigns that divide the adversary from its key pillars of support are in a better position to succeed. Nonviolent campaigns have a strategic advantage in this regard.<sup>20</sup>

To summarize, rather than effectiveness resulting from a supposed threat of violence, nonviolent campaigns achieve success through sustained pressure derived from mass mobilization that withdraws the regime's economic, political, social, and even military support from domestic populations and third parties. Leverage is achieved when the adversary's most important supporting organizations and institutions are systematically pulled away through mass noncooperation.

For example, sustained economic pressure targeting state-owned and private businesses and enterprises has been an important element in many successful popular movements (Ackerman and DuVall 2000; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973; Zunes, Kurtz, and Asher 1999). As the antiapartheid struggle in South Africa demonstrated, massive collective actions such as strikes and boycotts can impose significant economic costs on those benefiting from the status quo.<sup>21</sup>

As in South Africa, the cumulative costs of continuous nonviolent resistance may limit the possible or desirable courses of action available to economic and political elites, often forcing them to negotiate on terms favorable to the nonviolent campaign. Sustained pressure through civic mobilization, combined with the belief that the opposition represents a burgeoning and viable governing alternative, can influence key regime adherents, causing them to reconsider their preferences and alternatives to the status quo (Wood 2000, 21). This dynamic has marked a number of democratic transitions, including those in Chile, the Philippines, and Eastern Europe

(see, e.g., Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005; Bernhard 1993; Brownlee 2007; Collier 1999; Eckstein 2001; McFaul 2007; Schock 2005; Sharp 1973).

In cases where there is an inverse economic dependency relationship (meaning the opposition is more dependent on the state than vice versa) it may be difficult for a civil resistance campaign to achieve significant leverage without working through parties with closer political and economic ties to the state. Examples of nonviolent campaigns in this circumstance are the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Tibetans in China-controlled Tibet, and the West Papuans in Indonesian-controlled West Papua, all of whom are more economically dependent on the state than vice versa. Although consumer boycotts and labor stoppages launched by populations living under foreign occupation can impose certain degrees of economic costs on the occupying power (as occurred when Palestinians boycotted Israeli products and withheld labor during the First Intifada), the impact is much smaller than when the regime is more economically dependent on the resisting population, as is the case with many nonviolent campaigns challenging regimes (Dajani 1994; King 2007; Stephan 2005, 2006). This may be especially true when a state is subsidized from the outside such that it can survive internal economic disruption.<sup>22</sup> These so-called rentier states, which rely on external sources, including export sales in natural resources, tourism, and economic aid for a sizable portion of net income, have proven to be especially resistant to domestic pressure (Carothers 1999; Carothers and Ottoway 2005; Diamond 2008; Ibrahim 2008).

An inverse dependency relationship between a state and a nonviolent campaign does not doom the nonviolent campaign to failure, however. In a number of antiauthoritarian struggles, economic crises combined with organized mass nonviolent pressure have led to the ouster of regimes reliant on external rents believed to be immune to such pressure (e.g., Iran, Indonesia). In certain cases of foreign occupation, working with or through third parties has helped nonviolent campaigns to “extend the nonviolent battlefield” and gain increased leverage over its adversary.<sup>23</sup>

Violent campaigns, we suggest, are more likely to reinforce the adversary's main pillars of support and increase their loyalty and obedience to the regime, as opposed to pulling apart and reducing their loyalties to the regime. A “rally around the flag” effect is more likely to occur when the adversary is confronted with violent resistance than with a disciplined nonviolent campaign that makes its commitment to nonviolent means known.



Although small armed groups may be perceived as threatening to a regime's survivability, states may be more susceptible to internal fissures in the face of massive nonviolent action than to limited, violent opposition. In short, campaigns of nonviolent resistance tend to enjoy mass, broad-based support and, in some cases, mass defections by erstwhile regime supporters, who see a future in supporting a growing opposition movement as opposed to supporting the regime or a relatively small group of armed oppositionists.

### Loyalty Shifts

When a resistance campaign is able to influence the loyalties and interests of people working in society's dominant institutions, it increases its chances of success (Greene 1974, 57; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 306). Campaigns can shift power relations vis-à-vis the adversary by accessing sympathizers or defectors within the elite or among ordinary people who work below the elite. Regimes often grant concessions when acts of protest or noncooperation lead to shifts in people's loyalties and interests—or perceptions thereof. Thus measuring the impact of different forms of resistance on the loyalties and interests of a regime's key pillars of political and military support may help to predict campaign success and failure.

Evidence of defections within the ranks of the military, for instance, would suggest that the regime no longer commands the cooperation and obedience of its most important pillar of support. We generated a dichotomous variable that identifies defections among a regime's security forces. This measure does not include routine individual defections but rather large-scale, systematic breakdowns in the execution of a regime's orders.<sup>24</sup> We consider security defections a strict measure of loyalty shifts within the regime, not capturing civil servant or bureaucrat loyalty shifts. This strict measure includes defections occurring up to the end of the campaign.

The ability to produce divisions among elites may be augmented when the resistance has widespread participation. With a large number of participants, the chances for kinship ties or other social networks linking members of the elite to the larger civilian population increase. The importance of even loose ties between regime elites and the resistance is illustrated by Srdja Popovic, a member of the student group Otpor in Serbia. Popovic made the following observations regarding the relationship between Milosevic's police and the mass, nonviolent resistance movement that was pressuring the regime to stand down following stolen elections in 2000:

We were producing the [*sic*] sympathy in the wider audience . . . It was quite normal to produce in people who are parents because they can recognize their own children in Otpor activists. But as for the police, we tried three times to approach them and third time it was useful [*sic*]. First time, we developed a message . . . Our message was "there is no war between police and us." Somebody else is misusing the police against students. It's abnormal. There is no reason for the police to fight against the future of this country—and we were repeating that and repeating that in our public actions. (Popovic 2009)

Popovic's mention of members of the regime as "parents" of some of the Otpor activists underscores the importance of wide networks that link members of society to members of the regime itself. As other scholars have shown, the larger the resistance, the more likely such networks exist, with meaningful links between the regime and the resistance (Binnendijk 2008; Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Jaafar and Stephan 2010). This is another reason why the actions and proclivities of a state's security forces—the military and the police—are barometers of the strength of the opposition movement. We illuminate this point in the case study section of the book.

While their demands strain state budgets, nonviolent campaigns may also lead soldiers, policemen, and (often later) their commanding officers to question the viability, risks, and potential costs of military actions against the nonviolent campaign (Hathaway 2001). This occurred within the ranks of the Iranian armed forces during the anti-Shah resistance, to Filipino armed forces during the anti-Marcos uprising, within the Israeli military during the First Intifada, and over the course of the Indonesian military campaign in East Timor, to take but a few examples. Fighting an armed actor is likewise costly but is less likely to create as much introspection among the commanding officers, who might instead feel physically threatened by the violence and view the violent insurgents as minorities within the population resorting to violence out of desperation or a desire to inflict punishment. Regime functionaries are therefore less likely to see violent protestors as potential bargaining partners than with nonviolent groups.

Among economic elites within the regime, perception of costly continued conflict may convince them to pressure the regime to adopt conciliatory policies toward the resistance. Wood argues that the accumulating costs of the insurgencies in South Africa and El Salvador and their attendant repres-



sion ultimately convinced economic elites to press the regimes to negotiate, changing the balance of power within the regimes between those willing to consider compromise and those resolutely opposed (2000, 6).

If our theory is correct, nonviolent campaigns should be more successful at inducing loyalty shifts within the regime than violent campaigns, especially nonviolent campaigns with mass participation. We tested this hypothesis by measuring whether there were significant shifts in loyalty among state security forces during the course of a campaign.<sup>3</sup>

The results in Model 1(a) in table 2.3 suggest that large campaigns with a commitment to nonviolent resistance are more likely than violent insurgencies to produce defections within security forces. In fact, the largest nonviolent campaigns have about a 60 percent chance of producing security-force defections, an increase of over 50 percent from the smallest nonviolent campaigns. The substantive effects of nonviolent campaigns on security-force defections are visible in figure 2.2. For nonviolent campaigns, the probability of security-force defections steadily increases as membership in the resistance campaign grows. On the other hand, the odds of successfully converting military forces to the insurgent side remain between 10 percent and 40 percent for violent insurgents, with only a modest increase in probability as participation increases. Faced with a violent insurgency, security forces are likeliest to unify behind the regime, as the fight becomes a contest of brute force rather than strategic interaction. Under such conditions, security

TABLE 2.3 THE EFFECT OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE ON MECHANISMS

MODEL 1(A)		PROBABILITY OF SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED		.25** (.11)	+5%
POPULATION, LOGGED			
NONVIOLENT* PARTICIPANTS		-.18 (.14)	--
CONSTANT		-1.77 (1.56)	26%
N		163	
CHI <sup>2</sup>		5.52	
PROB > CHI <sup>2</sup>		.0632	
PSEUDO R <sup>2</sup>		.0413	


MODEL 2(A)		PROBABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE REGIME	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN		3.50** (.335)	+62%
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED		.64*** (.22)	+10%
POPULATION, LOGGED		-.01 (.12)	--
NONVIOLENT* PARTICIPANTS		-.42** (.32)	--
CONSTANT		-7.16*** (2.46)	20%
N		163	
CHI <sup>2</sup>		10.59	
PROB > CHI <sup>2</sup>		.0315	
PSEUDO R <sup>2</sup>		.0842	
MODEL 3(A)		PROBABILITY OF STATE SPONSORSHIP	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN		-2.72*** (.77)	-44%
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED		.29** (.15)	+6%
POPULATION, LOGGED		-.25** (.12)	-5%
CONSTANT		-.37 (1.82)	26%
N		163	
CHI <sup>2</sup>		17.55	
PROB > CHI <sup>2</sup>		.0005	
PSEUDO R <sup>2</sup>		.1569	

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS: \*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ ; LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AROUND TARGET COUNTRY CODE.

forces may become even more loyal to the regime, or the regime may purge ambivalent troops from its ranks.

But security-force defections are only the most extreme form of loyalty shifts in an opponent regime. We cannot quantify the noncooperation of civilian bureaucrats, economic elites, and other members of society whose withdrawal of consent from the regime may be critical to the outcome of a resistance campaign. But such groups may be even more threatened by violent insurgency than the military, which can provide its personnel with nominal physical protection. One might expect civilian bureaucrats to be even more inclined toward regime loyalty when faced with a violent insurgency. They may be more introspective, though, faced with a mass, nonviolent campaign.

FIGURE 2.2 THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATION ON SECURITY-FORCE DEFECTIONS



### Backfiring

Loyalty shifts may occur directly in response to opposition activities, or in response to regime actions that are perceived as unjust or excessive. One common scenario leading to loyalty shifts is when the regime violently cracks down on a popular nonviolent campaign with mass civilian participation. In this case, the regime's actions may backfire, a process that occurs when an action is counterproductive for the perpetrator (Martin 2007, 3). Backfiring creates a situation in which the resistance leverages the miscalculations of the regime to its own advantage, as domestic and international actors that support the regime shift their support to the opposition because of specific actions taken by the regime (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, 416).<sup>26</sup>

Repressing nonviolent campaigns may backfire if the campaigns have widespread sympathy among the civilian population by turning erstwhile passive supporters into active participants in the resistance (DeNardo 1985, 217). Alternatively, repressing nonviolent activists may lead to loyalty shifts by increasing the internal solidarity of the resistance, increasing foreign support for it, or increasing dissent within the enemy ranks—provided violent

counterreprisals by the resistance do not occur. This effect may be catalyzed further if the repression is communicated to domestic and international audiences that are prepared to act (Boserup and Mack 1974, 84; Martin 2007; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).<sup>27</sup>

Resistance of any kind against a regime is often met with repression. In fact, in our data set, 88 percent of all campaigns met with violent resistance from their adversaries. However, it is easier for states to justify violent crackdowns and draconian measures (like the imposition of martial law or states of emergency) to domestic and international audiences when they are challenged by an armed insurgency (Martin 2007, 163).<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, converting, co-opting, or successfully appealing to the interests of those targeted with violence is more difficult, because, as mentioned, regime members and security forces are more likely to think defensively in the face of a violent threat (Abrahms 2006). This explanation is counterintuitive, because it is often assumed that violent repression always *weakens* nonviolent campaigns relative to violent campaigns (Schock 2003, 706).

If we are correct, then a nonviolent strategy should be more likely to succeed against a repressive opponent than a violent strategy. We test this hypothesis in Model 1(b) in table 2.4. The results suggest that when regimes crack down violently, reliance on a nonviolent strategy increases the probability of campaign success by about 22 percent. Among the campaigns we explore here, backfiring may be an important mechanism through which nonviolent campaigns achieve success.

TABLE 2.4 THE EFFECTS OF MECHANISMS ON THE PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

MODEL 1(B)		PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS, WHEN REGIME CRACKS DOWN	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN		.92*** (.36)	+22%
POPULATION, LOGGED		-.20* (.12)	-5%
CONSTANT		1.21 (1.08)	41%
N		181	
CHI <sup>2</sup>		8.27	
PROB > CHI <sup>2</sup>		.0160	
PSEUDO R <sup>2</sup>		.0453	

TABLE 2.4 (CONTINUED)

MODEL 2(B)		PROBABILITY OF NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED		.49** (.17)	+9%
VIOLENT REGIME REPRESSION		-.76 (.80)	--
SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS		3.18** (.74)	+58%
STATE SPONSORSHIP		.97 (.43)	--
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS		-.99 (1.23)	--
CONSTANT		-4.20** (1.97)	57%
N		80	
CHI <sup>2</sup>		24.33	
PROB > CHI <sup>2</sup>		.0002	
PSEUDO R <sup>2</sup>		.2953	
MODEL 3(B)		PROBABILITY OF VIOLENT CAMPAIGN SUCCESS	MARGINAL EFFECTS
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS, LOGGED		-.11 (.13)	--
VIOLENT REGIME REPRESSION		-.98 (.64)	--
SECURITY FORCE DEFECTIONS		.18 (.40)	--
STATE SPONSORSHIP		.86** (.48)	+15%
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS		.82 (.62)	--
CONSTANT		.00 (1.37)	21%
N		178	
CHI <sup>2</sup>		11.10	
PROB > CHI <sup>2</sup>		.0494	
PSEUDO R <sup>2</sup>		.0614	

SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS: \*\*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*  $p < .1$ ; LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AROUND TARGET COUNTRY CODE.

### International Sanctions and External Support

A resistance campaign may also achieve leverage over its adversary through diplomatic pressure or international sanctions against the adversary. International sanctions are certainly controversial; common arguments against them include the point that they often harm the civilian population more than the targeted regimes (Corrigh 2001; Seekins 2005).<sup>29</sup> They may be effective, however, in many cases (Marinov 2005). Such sanctions had discern-

ible effects in supporting successful opposition campaigns in South Africa and East Timor, to take just two examples (Martin 2007, 13, 15, 23). The ANC leadership had demanded sanctions for decades, but they came about only after mass nonviolent resistance had spread.<sup>30</sup> Some argue that the international sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa were critical in creating a bargaining space for the resistance campaigns to finally come to the negotiating table.<sup>31</sup>

Conversely, lack of sanctions or diplomatic pressure has often been cited as contributing to the failure of some opposition groups. Some have suggested, for example, that the application of sanctions by China or Russia would hasten the Burmese junta's downfall, or that pressure by South Africa would hasten the demise of the Robert Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe (Seekins 2005; U.S. State Department 2004). Absent economic and diplomatic backing from China, the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea would be on weak footing. Arab regimes in places like Saudi Arabia and Egypt benefit tremendously from Western (notably U.S.) political, economic, and military support.

International sanctions may be more easily generated when outside actors see large numbers of resistance participants as a sign of the movement's legitimacy and viability. The international repercussions of a violent crackdown against civilians who have made their commitment to nonviolent action known may be more severe than against those that could be credibly labeled as terrorists. We believe that the international community is more likely to contribute diplomatic support to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones. To test our thinking, we drew upon international sanctions data collected by Hubauer, Schott, and Elliott (1992).<sup>32</sup> In Model 2(a) in table 2.3, we measure the effects of nonviolent resistance and campaign membership on the likelihood that international sanctions will be applied against the opponent of the resistance movement.

The data show that large, nonviolent campaigns are likelier than small, armed campaigns to successfully receive international diplomatic support. Once again, it is not only the quantity of participants in terms of their numbers but also the reliance on civil resistance that leads to diplomatic support through sanctions. A nonviolent campaign is 70 percent likelier to receive diplomatic support through sanctions than a violent campaign.

State sponsors may also give direct assistance to resistance campaigns, depending on the political context and domestic conditions. Specifically, outside states may choose to contribute arms or financial assistance to an

insurgency when they have mutual interests with the insurgents. Pakistan and the United States, for example, supported the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan during the 1980s because both countries wished to see the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Nonviolent campaigns also sometimes receive direct support from foreign governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and global civil society. The aid often comes in the form of government financial assistance, sanctions targeting the adversary, diplomatic recognition or other forms of support for leading opposition activists, or NGO funding or training.<sup>33</sup> The Serbian resistance movement *Opor*, for example, received millions of dollars from funding agencies linked to the United States and European governments prior to the toppling of the Milosevic regime.

We find, however, that foreign governments are likelier to lend direct material support to violent resistance campaigns—which the states may see as their proxies—than to nonviolent campaigns.<sup>34</sup> Whereas 35 percent of the violent insurgencies received material support from a foreign state, less than 10 percent of nonviolent campaigns did so.

As Model 3(a) in table 2.3 identifies, holding other potential confounding variables constant, violent resistance campaigns are over 40 percent likelier to receive material support from a foreign state sponsor than nonviolent campaigns.

The aid of an external donor may help violent insurgents to wage successful campaigns against more powerful adversaries (Record 2006).<sup>35</sup> Many would argue, for example, that Franco's revolutionary fascists would have been defeated by the Spanish Republicans without the support of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy.

Ironically, however, external state support may also undermine insurgents' odds of success. State support is unreliable, inconsistently applied to opposition groups around the world, and sometimes ineffective in helping campaigns. States are fickle, as the PLO learned when Jordan expelled it in 1970. States are also known to attach many conditions to their aid, greatly complicating the strategic maneuverability of different actors (Byman 2005). Even when state sponsorship could be helpful to a campaign, as Clifford Bob notes, the decision to support resistance movements depends on a variety of internal considerations, including the donor's mission, sponsors, and the political atmosphere (2005).

State support may also create a free-rider problem, in which local populations perceive that participation in the campaign is unnecessary because

of foreign patronage. In fact, external support can at times delegitimize a movement in the eyes of the domestic population by leading to accusations of corruption within the movement. Alternatively, foreign support may drive away potential recruits who may be reluctant to act on behalf of a foreign state or to be associated with a foreign state's political designs.

State support may also undermine insurgent incentives to treat civilian populations with restraint, because civilians are viewed as dispensable rather than as the main sources of support. As Weinstein argues, for instance, insurgencies that must rely on local populations to finance the insurgency are much likelier to treat such populations with restraint and respect (2007). Insurgencies that obtain resources from elsewhere—such as from natural resource deposits or foreign donors—are much more likely to abuse the local population, thus undermining the ultimate goals of the insurgency.

Thus state support may be a double-edged sword, rife with trade-offs for insurgent groups. While it may provide violent insurgencies with more war matériel with which to wage the struggle, it may also undermine the relationship between the insurgency and the civilian population, a population whose support may be critical to the outcome of the campaign. Civil resistance movements, which by definition rely on civilian support for mobilization, do not face this conundrum, since over 90 percent of them execute their campaigns without the direct financial assistance of a foreign regime.

### **Tactical Diversity and Innovation**

Strategic innovation occurs with some regularity in both nonviolent and violent campaigns. However, we suggest that the greater the number of participants from different societal sectors involved in the campaign, the more likely the campaign is to produce tactical innovations. Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and Kurt Schock have argued that tactical innovation occurs "on the margins of existing repertoires," and as such, "the more expansive the margins, the greater the likelihood of permutation and innovation" (Schock 2005, 144). We have already pointed out that nonviolent campaigns attract a larger number of more diverse participants than violent campaigns because the physical, moral, and informational barriers to mobilization are lower. The diversity of these campaigns therefore offer them advantages with regard to tactical innovation (Schock 2005, 144).

A specific type of tactical diversity is shifting between methods of concentration and methods of dispersion. In methods of concentration, nonviolent campaigns gather large numbers of people in public spaces to engage in

civil resistance (Schock 2005, 51). Well-known applications of this method include the Gandhi-led Salt March in India, the student protests in Tiananmen Square, and the occupation of Red Square during the Russian Revolution. More recent examples of concentration methods include the mass sit-ins in Maidan Square in Kiev during the Orange Revolution, the creation of a tent city in downtown Beirut during the Lebanese Independence Intifada (also known as the Cedar Revolution), and the massive gatherings of Egyptians in Tahrir Square during the 2011 revolution. Methods of dispersion involve acts that spread out over a wider area, such as consumer boycotts, stay-aways, and go-slow actions at the workplace. Dispersion methods, like the consumer boycotts in South Africa, intentional obstructionism at the workplace by Germans during the French occupation of the Ruhr, labor strikes by oil workers during the Iranian revolution, and the banging of pots and pans by Chileans during the anti-Pinochet movement, force an adversary to spread out its repressive apparatus over a wider area, afford greater protection and anonymity to participants, and allow participants to engage in less-risky actions.

In violent campaigns, tactical diversity could include alternating between concentrated attacks and ambushes in urban areas and more dispersed hit-and-run attacks, bombings, and assassinations in smaller towns and villages. The Taliban's shift from direct engagements to reliance on IEDs targeting Afghan and international coalition forces is an example of tactical innovation in armed resistance. For both violent and nonviolent campaigns, adopting diverse tactics reduces the effectiveness of the adversary's repression and helps the campaign maintain the initiative (Schock 2005, 144). Tactical innovation enhances the campaign's adaptability and its room for maneuvering when the state focuses its repression on a particular set of tactics. This is especially crucial when the repression makes some tactics, like street protests, highly risky and dangerous (Schock 2005, 144).

Because tactical innovation occurs on the fringes of a movement, campaigns with larger numbers of participants, and consequently wider margins, are more likely to produce tactical innovations. The relatively larger number of active participants expands the repertoire of sanctions available to nonviolent campaigns, allowing them to shift between methods of concentration and dispersion while maintaining pressure on the adversary.<sup>36</sup> Tactical diversity and innovation enhance the ability of nonviolent resistance to strategically outmaneuver the adversary compared with armed insurgencies.

Tactical innovation in turn affects the resilience of campaigns over time, an issue we take up in the next section.

### **Evasion and Resilience**

Another significant challenge of resistance is opposition resilience, which "refers to the capacity of contentious actors to continue to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or inhibiting their activities" (Schock 2005, 142). Researchers can observe levels of resilience by determining a campaign's ability to maintain a significant number of participants, recruit new members, and continue to confront the adversary in the face of repression.

Many scholars consider resilience a crucial factor for campaign success, since it may determine the ability of the campaign to maintain its strategic advantage despite adversary oppression or attempts at co-optation (Bob and Nepstad 2007; Francisco 2004; Khawaja 1993; Koopmans 1993; Lichbach 1994; Moore 1998; Schock 2005; Weinstein 2007, 45). Continual regime counterattacks against a resistance campaign can remove key members of the campaign and raise the costs of continued participation among remaining members. States often use decapitation to undermine a campaign's organizational coherence over time.

A common assumption in security studies is that the ability to wage a successful war of attrition against a regime is a necessary determinant of resilience (Weinstein 2007, 37). Seizing territory or enjoying sanctuary from a neighboring state may allow violent insurgencies to meet two key challenges for resilience, maintaining their membership and recruitment operations in the face of state repression. Though their numbers may be smaller than mass nonviolent campaigns, violent insurgencies may be able to survive for decades, like the Karen insurgency in Burma, which has endured since 1949, and the FARC, which has waged guerrilla warfare against the Colombian state since 1964, and, for four decades (until their defeat in 2009), the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) waged a violent insurgency against the Sri Lankan central government. Although durable violent campaigns boast impressive stubbornness in the face of repressive and powerful adversaries, longevity does not necessarily translate into strategic success. Isolation in the countryside, in the mountains, or in neighboring safe havens does not necessarily afford violent insurgencies leverage over their state adversaries. The only reason why some violent insurgencies have been able to survive is that they operate

in remote areas not penetrated by the state, as with Taliban affiliates who maintain sanctuary in Pakistan's North-West Frontier.<sup>37</sup>

Persistence may be necessary to campaign success, but it is insufficient. To achieve success, a campaign must go beyond persistence and achieve a shift in power between the opposition and the adversary. Resilience involves increasing mobilization and action, maintaining key assets and resources, and bringing a diverse constellation of assets and tactics to bear against the adversary, regardless of whether the adversary is materially more powerful. Successful campaigns endure despite regime repression while making tangible progress toward stated goals, even if those goals change over time. Because of the tendency of nonviolent campaigns to involve mass numbers of diverse participants, they should be better suited than violent campaigns to maintain resilience and continue their operations regardless of the adversary's actions. Regime crackdowns arguably debilitate armed campaigns more than similar crackdowns against unarmed campaigns, because of the greater number of potential assets and "weapons" available to nonviolent resistance campaigns. This argument, which we illustrate in the case studies, clearly challenges the conventional wisdom.

#### **WHICH FACTORS MATTER MOST? EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF CIVIL RESISTANCE**

We have demonstrated that civil resistance campaigns have routinely outperformed violent insurgencies. We have also theorized that the participation advantages that nonviolent resistance campaigns enjoy activate a series of mechanisms—sometimes in conjunction with one another and sometimes independently—that lead to success. Nonviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to pull apart the opponent's pillars of support rather than push them together, to divide rather than unify the opponent; and to raise the political, social, and economic costs to the regime rather than to the regime's opposition. We now demonstrate which of these factors seem most influential in determining failure and success.

Interestingly, as table 2.4 shows, there are different determinants of success based on the primary resistance type. Nonviolent campaigns (Model 2[b]) have been most successful when they have produced security-force defections.<sup>38</sup> In fact, such defections increase the likelihood of success by nearly 60 percent. The number of participants is also important for nonviolent campaigns. An increase of a single unit improves the odds of success by

nearly 10 percent. Notably, however, neither foreign state support, nor international sanctions, nor regime crackdowns seem to positively or negatively affect the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns.

What these results suggest is that domestic mechanisms are the most critical components of the success of nonviolent campaigns. Regime crackdowns often backfire and are therefore not necessarily determinants of campaign failure. While foreign support or international sanctions may have been critical in some cases, there is no general pattern indicating that they are necessary for successful campaign outcomes.

The results are especially striking when compared with the determinants of violent insurgent success (Model 3[b]). Security-force defections and the number of participants are much less important in predicting the success of violent insurgencies. Instead, the presence of a foreign state sponsor is the main determinant of success. For violent insurgencies, neither international sanctions nor violent crackdowns have systematic effects in determining success or failure, though they may matter in individual cases. The presence of a foreign state sponsor increases the likelihood of success by about 15 percent, controlling for other factors.

#### **WHEN VIOLENT CAMPAIGNS SUCCEEDED: SOME KEY OUTLIERS**

It is worth noting that there are some important deviations from our assumption that violent campaigns attract only limited numbers of participants. The Russian Revolution (1917), Chinese Revolution (1946–1950), Algerian Revolution (1954–1962), Cuban Revolution (1953–1959), and Vietnamese Revolution (1959–1975) come to mind as major examples of violent conflicts that did generate mass support sufficient to bring about revolutionary change. Such cases are key outliers to the argument that nonviolent campaigns are likelier than violent campaigns to galvanize mass participation.

Upon examining the revolutions, however, it is clear that many of the features common to successful nonviolent campaigns occurred in these revolutions, especially diverse, mass mobilization, which led to loyalty shifts within the ruling regimes' economic and military elites. They also often had direct material support from foreign states. These and other successful armed campaigns typically succeeded both in achieving the direct support of foreign sponsors and in building a strong base of popular support while creating parallel administrative, political, social, and economic structures.<sup>39</sup>

The importance placed on mass mobilization and civilian noncooperation by scholars and theorists of revolutionary warfare suggests that the non-violent components of successful armed campaigns are as significant—or possibly even more significant—than the military component.

We do not dispute, therefore, that violent insurgencies succeed. In fact, about 25 percent of the cases in our data set have succeeded. But violent insurgencies succeed at much lower rates than civil resistance campaigns, and one must consider the consequences of such victories, as we do in chapter 8. Although violent insurgencies captured power in some cases, the human costs were very high, with millions of casualties. Moreover, the conditions in these countries after the conflict ended have been overwhelmingly more repressive than in transitions driven by nonviolent civic pressure. In all five cases, the new regimes featuring the victorious insurgents were harsh toward civilian populations after the dust had settled, with retaliatory violence targeting supporters of the former regime and lack of respect for human rights and minority rights being the norm. None of these countries could be classified today as democratic.

Such trends are not limited to these five cases. In a recent study of sixty-seven regime transitions between 1973 and 2000, Ackerman and Karatnycky find that among the twenty cases where opposition or state violence occurred, only four (20 percent) qualified as “free” (according to 2005 Freedom House criteria) at the time of the study (2005, 19). On the other hand, among forty cases where the major forces pushing the transition were non-violent civic coalitions, thirty-two (80 percent) were classified as “free” at the time of the study (2005, 19).

There are some clear theoretical reasons why successful nonviolent resistance leads to fewer civilian casualties and higher levels of democracy after the conflict than does successful violent resistance. Victorious violent insurgents often feel compelled to reestablish the monopoly on the use of force and therefore seek to purge any remaining elements of the state. Although they may seek to establish a democratic order, doing so will be difficult under circumstances of constant violent threat from regime holdovers. Even if the violent insurgency enjoyed mass support, the new state led by the former insurgents will quickly attempt to consolidate its power and remove the ability of the masses to rise up against it. Because the insurgents used violent methods to succeed in gaining power, there will be fewer inhibitions against the use of violent methods to maintain power. Indeed, the capacity to do so

may only increase. Therefore, although violent insurgency sometimes works, the long-term consequences leave much to be desired.

As for nonviolent campaigns that succeed, it is likely that these successes will become reference points for those particular societies, and nonviolent resistance will be regarded as an effective method of transforming conflicts. This does not suggest that such states will become pacifist states or that serious human rights violations will never occur, but rather that the shift from noninstitutional to institutional types of nonviolent means of dealing with dissent will be easier, even when normal channels for resolving conflicts are blocked, ineffective, or in the hands of a hostile party.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, the way in which nonviolent resistance tends to decentralize power in society leads to a greater ability of the population to hold elites accountable.<sup>41</sup> Scholars have long noted the positive impacts that a vibrant civil society can have on the quality of democracy (Putnam 1993). Opposition leaders that come to power via nonviolent resistance may feel the need to deliver public goods to the masses given that failure to respond to public demands may result in yet another ouster. In these ways, mass participation and mobilization through nonviolent action may contribute to a greater sense of trust and accountability when the conflict is over.

## CONCLUSION

The primary aims of this chapter have been twofold. First, we argue that nonviolent resistance campaigns have been more successful at achieving higher and more diverse participation than violent insurgencies. Domestic mobilization is a more reliable source of power than foreign sponsorship, which most violent insurgencies must seek to pursue their ends. Second, we argue that large-scale participation often translates into tactical and strategic advantages, as the mass withdrawal of cooperation forces the regime to capitulate to the campaign's demands. The ability of nonviolent campaigns to mobilize a higher number of participants with a more diverse array of skills, abilities, and perspectives explains why they have been so successful at activating local mechanisms of change in their societies, including shifts in loyalty from the regime to the resistance and the ability to make regime repression backfire. The historic tendency of nonviolent movements to effectively compel regime loyalists to their side underscores the primacy of participation in generating the mechanisms that determine campaign victory or defeat.



SIKH INSURGENCY	INDIA	SEPARATISM	1984	1994	FAILURE
TAIWANESE REVOLT	CHINA	CHINESE OCCUPATION	1947	1947	FAILURE
KURDISH REBELLION	IRAQ	SECESSION	1985	1993	FAILURE
SHAMMAR TRIBE AND PRO-WESTERN OFFICERS	IRAQ	GASSIM REGIME	1959	1959	FAILURE
SAYA SANT'S REBELLION	BURMA	BRITISH OCCUPATION	1930	1932	FAILURE
ERP/MONTENEGROS	ARGENTINA	ARGENTINIAN REGIME	1973	1977	FAILURE
ANTI-BOLSHEVICS	RUSSIA	BOLSHEVIK REGIME	1917	1921	FAILURE
KIRGHIZ AND KAZABLES	RUSSIA	ROMANOV REGIME	1916	1917	SUCCESS
REBELS					
DERVISH RESISTANCE	SOMALIA	BRITISH AND ETHIOPIAN OCCUPATION	1899	1905	FAILURE
LEFTIST REBELLION	EL SALVADOR	AUTHORITARIAN MARTINEZ REGIME	1932	1932	FAILURE
PAIGC	GUINEA-BISSAU	PORTUGUESE OCCUPATION	1963	1974	SUCCESS
LIBERALS AND RADICALS	MEXICO	DIAZ REGIME	1910	1920	SUCCESS
REBELLION					
MAJI MAJI REVOLT	TANZANIA/GERMAN EAST	GERMAN COLONIZERS	1905	1906	FAILURE
LURD	AFRICA				
PEASANT/WORKER REBEL-LION	LIBERIA	TAYLOR REGIME	2003	2003	SUCCESS
	RUSSIA	ROMANOV DYNASTY	1905	1906	PARTIAL
PROLINA	CHAD	CHADIAN GOVERNMENT	1966	1990	SUCCESS
MALAYAN EMERGENCY	MALAYSIA	BRITISH OCCUPATION	1948	1960	PARTIAL
FLNC	ZAIRE/DRC	DRC/ZAIREAN REGIME	1977	1978	FAILURE
KARENS	BURMA	BURMESE GOVERNMENT	1948	2006	FAILURE
NATIONAL RESISTANCE	UGANDA	OKELLO REGIME	1980	1988	SUCCESS
ARMY					
KHMER ROUGE	CAMBODIA	CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT	1978	1997	FAILURE
CUBAN REVOLUTION	CUBA	BATISTA REGIME	1956	1959	SUCCESS
LEFTISTS	YEMEN PEO-PLER'S REPUBLIC	ALI NASIR REGIME	1986	1986	PARTIAL
ANTICOMMUNIST MOVEMENT(WHITES)	HUNGARY	COMMUNIST REGIME	1919	1920	SUCCESS
SHANTI BAHINI	BANGLADESH	AUTONOMY FROM BANGLADESH	1976	1997	FAILURE
PEASANTS IN TA (TAMBOY REBELLION)	USSR	SOVIET REGIME	1920	1921	FAILURE
CACO REVOLT	HAITI	U.S. OCCUPATION	1918	1920	FAILURE
PEASANT REBELLION	ROMANIA	LAND-DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM	1907	1907	FAILURE
BEIARUS RESISTANCE	USSR	NAZI OCCUPATION	1941	1945	FAILURE
REBELS (PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY PARTY)	ZAIRE/DRC	MOBUTU REGIME	1993	1993	FAILURE

## 1. THE SUCCESS OF NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE CAMPAIGNS

1. East Timor is a former Portuguese colony.
2. Indonesian forces killed most of the Falintil commanders, eliminated approximately 80 percent of their bases, and assumed control over approximately 90 percent of the East Timorese population. Most of the East Timorese died from starvation following forced displacement (Taur Matan Ruak, interview by Maria J. Stephan, Dili, East Timor, January 11, 2005).
3. "Clinton Demands Indonesia Accept International Force," *Agence France Press*, September 9, 1999; "US Cuts Military Ties with Indonesia," *Reuters*, September 9, 1999; Sanders Thoenes, "What Made Jakarta Accept Peacekeepers," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 14, 1999.
4. Fr. Jovito, interview by Maria J. Stephan, Dili, East Timor, on December 29, 2004.
5. When we use the term *violent resistance*, we are referring to nonstate armed opposition campaigns. This includes campaigns associated with insurgencies (Lyall and Wilson 2009), guerrilla warfare, nonstate combatants in civil wars (Gleditsch 2004), and terrorist campaigns (Pape 2005). Nonviolent resistance refers to nonstate unarmed opposition campaigns. We use the terms *nonviolent resistance* and *civil resistance* interchangeably. See also Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2006) and their supplement, available online at <http://www.civilresistance.info> (accessed December 19, 2009). For more information, see the online appendix at <http://cedenoweth.faculty.wesleyan.edu/wcrw/>.
6. See the online appendix for a discussion of the NAVCO data set and coding rules.
7. The loss or gain of regime capabilities may be causally related to the campaign. Resistance campaigns may be partly responsible for degrading regime capabilities, or regimes may increase their capabilities to respond to a campaign. In chapter 3, however, we find such endogenous processes to be relatively unimportant. Even when aggregate government capabilities fluctuate in a country, such fluctuations are not systematically related to the outcomes of the campaigns.
8. To clarify the distinction between "normal" political action and nonviolent action, Schock uses this example: The display of antiregime posters in democracies would be considered a low-risk and regular form of political action, whereas the same activity in nondemocracies would be considered irregular and involve significant risk. Because of this difference in context and intention, the latter would be considered a form of nonviolent action, whereas the former would not. Similarly, strikes that occur in democratic societies within the normal bounds of institutionalized labor relations, writes Schock, cannot be considered nonviolent action, since they are not noninstitutional or indeterminate. On the other hand, most strikes in nondemocracies would be considered nonviolent action because of their indeterminate, noninstitutionalized, high-risk features (Schock 2003, 795).



9. In vol. 2, Sharp lists 198 methods of nonviolent action and cites at least one historical example of each method's application.
10. In acts of omission participants refuse to perform acts that they usually perform, are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regulation to perform; in acts of commission participants perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation to perform; this method of resistance may involve a combination of acts of omission and commission (Sharp 2005, 41, 547).
11. For general literature on insurgency and counterinsurgency, see Beckett (2007), Joes (2007), Fishel and Manwaring (2006), Greskovits (1998), Chialand (1982), Laqueur (1976).
12. The online appendix defines and discusses different types of unconventional asymmetrical warfare types, including guerrilla warfare, insurgency, insurrections, coups, revolutions, and terrorism. For a succinct review, see Galula (2006, 1-10).
13. Baldwin (2000) critiques the success/failure dichotomy, arguing that policy makers must use more nuanced gradations and evaluations of effectiveness. Although we agree that the subject is complex, such methods prohibit comparison across a large number of cases, which is our primary aim here. Thus, we simply use a high bar to evaluate whether a campaign has succeeded or failed, requiring the campaigns to have achieved their goals and to have had a distinguishable effect on the outcome. When we include counts of "limited success," the results are even more sympathetic toward nonviolent campaigns. See the online appendix for details.
14. Other scholars often use campaigns as their units of analysis, such as Page (2005) and Horowitz and Reiter (2001). McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly argue that social scientists should consider examining movement behavior as "episodes" rather than as individual events (2001).
15. There are some difficulties with this method. First, it is difficult to gather the strength of the movement and its activities over time (i.e., escalation or deescalation). Second, without specific events data, it is theoretically difficult to compare all campaigns as equal when we know that some are much more disruptive than others. However, there are good reasons to analyze campaigns rather than events. First, events data are so difficult to gather—especially nonviolent events data—that making generalizations about nonviolent conflict is virtually impossible. By analyzing campaigns rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities. Using events as the main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaigns allows us to consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.
16. Moreover, his characterization of the main forms of resistance used in the United States may not be correct.
17. Sharp's minimalist definition of violence is that which inflicts or threatens to inflict bodily harm on another human being (Sharp 2003, 38).
18. See also Simon (1992, 77).
19. The Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival at Harvard combined the quantitative study of nonviolent direct action with anthropological insights from 1972 to 2005 under the leadership of David Maybury-Lewis. Doug Bond has continued the collection of events data on nonviolent action in both the Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action project and the Integrated Data

for Events Analysis project. Neither of these data sets, however, has been used to systematically test the effectiveness of nonviolent vs. violent resistance, at least in publicly available material.

20. Robert Page (2009), Max Abrahams (2006), and Mia Bloom (2005) have led the debate with regard to terrorism, and Page (1996, 1997) and Horowitz and Reiter (2001) have debated the effectiveness of aerial bombing, economic sanctions, and other tactics of persuasion or coercion. Others, such as Liddell Hart (1954), André Beaufre (1965), Colin Gray (1999), Gil Merom (2003), Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson (2009), and Ivan Arreguín-Toft (2001, 2005), have made contributions to our understanding of why certain strategies succeed and others fail in unconventional warfare.
  21. See also Aijomand (1998) and Skocpol (1979).
  22. See especially chapter 5, "Denmark, the Netherlands, the Rosenstrasse: Resisting the Nazis."
  23. Our statistics remain similar, however, when we exclude ongoing campaigns from our analysis.
  24. See Chenoweth and Lawrence (2010) for an argument on why comparing the relative effectiveness of nonviolent and violent strategies is necessary to determine success.
- ## 2. THE PRIMACY OF PARTICIPATION IN NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE
1. Our theory is based on truly voluntaristic bottom-up civic mobilization; we do not include paid crowds that come out to support different politicians for compensation ("rent-a-crowds," as some call them).
  2. We relied on countless encyclopedic and open sources to generate these figures. Please see the online appendix for details.
  3. We were unable to find reliable participation figures for about 20 percent of the observations. We conducted a series of tests to determine whether there were systematic conditions that caused the data to be unavailable, and we found no significant evidence of that. We also used multiple imputation techniques to reestimate our analyses using imputed membership figures. We found no significant difference in any of the results reported throughout this book. See the online appendix for more information.
  4. Fanon, influenced by a Marxist paradigm that equates violence with power, probably did not consider that nonviolent resistance could engender similarly intense feelings of individual and collective empowerment and meaning.
  5. Martyrdom, of course, does not necessarily entail killing another person while struggling and dying for a cause. Here, cultural interpretations are critical.
  6. About 40 percent of the campaigns in the data set boast over twenty-five thousand participants.
  7. In nearly all models, we control for population size for several reasons. First, multiple authors have found that countries with large populations are more difficult for leaders to control (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Herbst 2000; Smith 2007, 26). Second, one of our primary explanatory variables—the number of campaign participants—is not as meaningful without taking into account the total population size of the country. One hundred thousand participants in a country of 1 million people is much more meaningful than one hundred thousand participants in a country of 30 million people.
  8. Sharp (1973) identifies over 198 nonviolent tactics (including strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, and occupations), and scholars have since expanded the list to include many more because of advances in communications technology (Martin 2001).

9. At the same time, satellite television and the Internet have made it easier for armed resistance groups to communicate their goals, attract recruits, and exaggerate their membership. This is also true for nonviolent resistance campaigns.
10. See Rosemary and Mack (1974) on the advantages and disadvantages of underground and aboveground activity.
11. When the regime responds to the insurgency with indiscriminate violence, Matthew Kocher and Stathis Kalyvas (2007) argue that incentives to join or support the insurgency increase. However, they do not compare how those incentives might be different with nonviolent campaigns vs. violent ones.
12. Thanks to Hardy Martin for this insight.
13. Other times, however, simple acts of nonviolent defiance can result in imprisonment, unemployment, and the threatening or disappearance of loved ones. However, as we argue, such repressive regime actions are likelier to backfire when used against nonviolent campaigns than when applied against violent campaigns.
14. Marginal effects identify the percentage change per single unit increase in the independent variable. By a "single unit" increase, we mean a single standard deviation for continuous variables, and a change from 0 to 1 for the dummy variables.
15. A potential concern is that of reverse causation: that large membership is what permits nonviolent campaigns to remain nonviolent, whereas violent campaigns adopt violence precisely because they cannot attract large numbers of participants. If this argument is correct, we should expect to see two things. First, we should expect to see large numbers of people spontaneously hitting the streets, followed by a decision on the part of the campaign leadership to commit to nonviolent resistance. Second, we should expect to see large campaigns abandon violence when it is clear that the membership is sufficient to win the day using nonviolent resistance. In general, we are dubious of this argument. We conducted a test to determine whether the relationship between the choice of violent resistance was endogenous to membership and found no statistical support for this claim (see the online appendix). Second, in several of the cases we examine in part 2, it is clear that the nonviolent campaigns experienced a gradual increase in membership over time. Moreover, some violent campaigns that achieved large memberships, such as the Chinese Revolution or the Russian Revolution, did not abandon nonviolent resistance once they obtained a critical mass. Instead, they used their membership to wage wars to the death against the incumbent regimes. In reality, it is difficult to disentangle these relationships and virtually impossible to do so using statistical analysis with the data in its current form. In the case studies, though, it is possible to see that the campaigns' commitment to nonviolent resistance is one factor that encouraged large-scale mobilization, whereas the use of violent methods discouraged participation.
16. Arreguin-Toft (2005) argues that during strategic interactions between stronger and weaker conflict parties, the use of opposite tactics (indirect-direct) against a stronger adversary can translate into victory for the weaker power. Others have argued that continual and escalating disruption is the key variable determining success (Wood 2000).
17. For figures of attacks perpetrated by the communist insurgency in Nepal, see START/CETIS (2008).
18. For applications of the positive radical flank effect, see Barkan (1979); Gansson (1990); Haines (1984); Jenkins and Eckert (1986); Marger (1984); and McAdam (1999).
19. For different viewpoints on this topic, see Burton (1989); Colby (1985); Gansson (1990); Haines (1988); Jenkins and Eckert (1986); McAdam (1999); Mueller (1978); Piven and Cloward (1979); Schumaker (1975); Schock (2005, 47-49); and Sharp (1973). While the concept of radical flank effects is interesting and important, we do not take on simultaneity of violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns, since we are dealing primarily with ideal types. Empirical studies could help shed light on the different effects of radical flanks.
20. Robert Helweg defines "pillars of support" as "the institutions and sections of society that supply the existing regime with the needed sources of power to maintain and expand its power capacity" (2004, 160).
21. International actions can complement these domestic actions, such as when the international divestment campaign targeting the apartheid regime created significant economic pressure, which was an important factor in the regime's ultimate decision to negotiate with the ANC. In another example of complementary internal and external actions, the withholding of loans and economic assistance by international financial institutions to the Suharto regime in Indonesia (against the backdrop of the 1998 Asian financial crisis) combined with a mass popular uprising in that country led to Suharto's ouster. The withdrawal of external financial support to the Marcos regime in the Philippines similarly coincided with an economic crisis in the early 1980s combined with a broadening anti-Marcos movement inside the country that enjoined the support of moderate reformers, church leaders, and businesspeople, a move toward the center by the opposition that would have been unlikely had the resistance been confined to communist and Muslim guerrillas.
22. For example, the junta in El Salvador was able to survive a wave of strikes from 1979 to 1981 because of the junta's strong support from the United States. Thanks to Stephen Zunes for this point.
23. For an elaboration on the notion of extending the nonviolent battlefield to address the challenge of inverse dependency relationships in the context of civil resistance campaigns, see Stephan (2006); Stephan and Mundy (2006); Stephan (2005); Galtung (1989, 19); and Schock (2005).
24. Data are gleaned from multiple sources listed in the online appendix.
25. In an additional model reported in the online appendix, we generated an interaction term, which combines the membership and nonviolent resistance variables, to estimate the probability that a combination of high membership in a nonviolent resistance has on the probability of inducing loyalty shifts. A joint significance test reveals that the model including all three independent variables is jointly significant ( $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.09$ ), and multiple bivariate regressions reveal a positive relationship between nonviolent resistance and security-force defections.
26. Brian Martin emphasizes the important role played by media coverage of contentious interaction involving unarmed protesters and security forces. Furthermore, regimes have developed their own strategies to inhibit the effects of backfiring (2007). Martin's concept of backfiring is a more nuanced approach to what Gene Sharp first described as "political jiu-jitsu" (Sharp 1973).
27. A combination of sustained confrontation with the adversary, the maintenance of nonviolent discipline, and the existence of a sympathetic audience may be necessary conditions for triggering jiu-jitsu. See Martin (2007) and Martin and Varney (2003).
28. This is not to suggest that it is necessarily strategically wise for nonviolent campaigns to purposefully evoke repression from their adversaries. On the contrary, many nonviolent campaigns have succeeded without relying on the backfire backfiring process.
29. There is an entire body of literature about sanctions, including work by David Cortright, Daniel Drezner, and others. For an example of an applied work on sanctions, see Cortright (2001).

30. On the role of international sanctions in the South African anti-apartheid struggle, see Ackerman and DuVall (2000); Schock (2005); Zunes, Kuritz, and Asher (1999). On the role of democratic embassies in the anti-apartheid struggle, see the Community of Democracies' *A Diplomat's Handbook*, available at <http://www.diplo-handbook.org>.
  31. The relative importance of the armed and nonviolent resistances in the anti-apartheid struggle is controversial. Some have argued that the violent and nonviolent resistances were complementary (Lodge 2009). Others have argued that these forms of resistance were not complementary, and that the ANC-led armed struggle played a far less important role than the mass nonviolent resistance in ending apartheid (Barrel 1993; Lodge 2009).
  32. We created a dichotomous variable, which is coded 1 if there were economic sanctions launched against a country in response to its treatment of a resistance campaign and 0 if otherwise. See the online appendix for details. A joint significance test reveals that the interaction term and its two components are jointly significant ( $\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = 0.02$ ).
  33. On NGO support and global civil society, see Bob (2005) and Schock (2005), respectively. On the role of transnational advocacy networks in supporting local nonviolent movements, see Keck and Sikkink (1998).
  34. Clifford Bob writes a more careful exegesis on the conditions under which rebel groups are able to secure foreign sponsorship (2005), which is not necessarily our aim here.
  35. State sponsorship of insurgencies and terrorist groups has been an ongoing foreign policy dilemma for decades (Byman 2005).
  36. Schock argues that the more broad based participation is, the more likely that tactical innovations will occur (2005, 144).
  37. Thanks to Kurt Schock for this point. For more information on the importance of sanctuary for insurgencies, see Salehyan (2007, 2008, 2009).
  38. We need to give a caveat for Model 2(b), because it contains fewer than one hundred observations. Long (1997) suggests that researchers avoid sample sizes of less than a hundred when using maximum likelihood estimation, since the results tend to be unstable. We reestimated the model without the membership variable, which contains missing data. The results were the same when  $N = 106$ , although the significance of violent regime repression increases.
  39. Mao Zedong's writings on revolutionary warfare emphasize the importance of building oppositional consciousness, winning broad-based support, and achieving mass mobilization. The creation of parallel structures and institutions—a form of nonviolent intervention—is another critical component of successful revolutionary warfare. See Chaland (1982); Laqueur (1977); Sun-Tzu (1963).
  40. In some cases, like the Philippines and Thailand, major disputes continue to be resolved in the streets via people power movements rather than through normal political channels.
  41. Thanks to Hardy Meriman for this insight.
- ### 3. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF CIVIL RESISTANCE
1. Of course, domestic and international factors are not completely isolated from one another. Local forces influence and are influenced by international pressures. We oversimplify these dynamics in the NAVCO data set and in our discussion here for theoretical and empirical purposes. However, much research remains to be done on the interaction between domestic and international support of resistance campaigns.

2. We consider these three factors independently of one another. The reason is that testing them all together causes a reduction in the sample size (because of missing data in many observations) such that accurate inferences are unlikely.
3. The CINC score is the most common indicator of power in international relations scholarship. But because this index measure does not take into account factors such as oil production, trade, and alliances as contributors to national strength, these figures should be taken as suggestive.
4. Please see the online appendix for more information about these variables and statistics. We also considered the possibility that changes in the opponent's regime type or capabilities over the course of the campaign may affect the probability of success. Skeptics may argue that nonviolent campaigns gather steam as the state enters a period of decline, that the success of nonviolent campaigns is more a function of external changes in the opponent government and that nonviolent campaigns emerge as a *response* to these changes. Thus, we consider the effects of nonviolent resistance, this time controlling for changes in the polity score, CIPD, and capabilities of the target country. The skeptic's expectation would be that significant decreases in these areas would make a campaign more likely to succeed. Our tests reveal that none of these factors significantly affected the odds of success, but the use of a nonviolent strategy improved the odds of success by 25 percent, even when accounting for changes in the opponent's regime type, a change in economic conditions, or a change in the target's military capabilities. Because of the small number of observations, the results are unstable, so we do not report them here.
5. We present these three maximalist goals as if they were either static or uniformly pursued by all factions in a resistance campaign. In practice, the classification of these campaigns was not clear-cut and required us to make judgment calls, where we attempted to characterize each campaign according to these broad categories. For an excellent analysis challenging the unitary-actor model, see Pearlman (2010).
6. Partial success indicates that the campaign achieved significant concessions short of our strict criterion of 100 percent success of stated objectives.
7. Eleven campaigns (seven violent, four nonviolent) do not fall into any of these three categories and are listed as "Other" campaigns. Among these campaigns, all seven violent campaigns failed, one nonviolent campaign failed, and three nonviolent campaigns succeeded. Thus, these campaigns also reflect the trends reported in table 3.2 ( $p = .007$ ).
8. Estimating the model using random effects shows no difference in the results (see the online appendix). Because this finding contradicts previous research on contagion effects or "waves" of democratization, further research on the subject is necessary (Huntington 1991; Kurzman 1998; Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida 1980; May 2008).
9. In the two-stage model, the first stage generates an instrumental variable that estimates the predicted probability that a campaign is violent. The second stage substitutes the instrument for the main independent variable to determine whether the instrument continues to predict the campaign outcome. The automatic model uses the ivprob estimator in Stata, which applies Amemiya's generalized least squares estimator with endogenous regressors using Newey's equations (1987); see Garzke and Jo (2009, 220m6).
10. Because secession may be correlated with failure, we construct instruments with and without this indicator. The results are not substantially different. The model with secession is a better instrument because it is more highly correlated with violent resistance than the model without secession.

